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Cuban Housing Privatization: A Comparative Perspective on the Future of
Housing in Havana, Cuba
Abstract
Following the fall of the Soviet Union, Cuba faced significant economic hardship and was forced to
reinvent its national economic model. To face this obstacle, Cuba opened up to foreign investment in in
real estate in 1995 and used tourism to grow its economy. However, tourism is ideologically inconsistent
with the Socialist values that lay at the foundation of the Castro regime and required the development of a
system of property rights. In 2011, Decree-Law 288 was established, which authorized the buying and
selling of homes between private citizens without government authorization and at market prices for the
first time in the history of the Castro government. This law—coupled with other recent developments in
Cuba—suggest that privatization of the housing sector could occur in Cuba within the next few years.
What might housing privatization in Cuba—or specifically Havana, where the majority of Cubans live and
where there is the most potential for tourism—look like? Traditional real estate tools are insufficient for
addressing this question because housing privatization involves moving from a public-oriented housing
system to a market-oriented housing system, and real estate tools work best with the latter. For this
reason, a method of analysis from comparative politics known as the Most Different Systems Design, a
comparative strategy that looks for shared outcomes between two very different case studies, was used.
Uncovered similarities must be explained by the underlying component that is shared between the case
studies: in this instance, post-Communist housing privatization. Russia and East Germany (or specifically,
their capital cities of Moscow and East Berlin) were chosen as the two most different case studies for a
number of reasons: different economy sizes and natures, different levels of popular support for Socialism
at the time of privatization, homegrown versus foreign revolutions, different legacies of capitalism,
different levels of development of political infrastructure, different privatization schemes, and different
levels of success post-facto.
To systematically compare East Berlin and Moscow, housing privatization was explored along three
different criteria: governmental housing policies and housing indicators, political context preceding and
during housing privatization, and ideology. By exploring these three broad categories systematically, a
more robust understanding of the similarities and differences between these two case studies can be
achieved. To contextualize government housing policies in terms of the impact they made on the
emerging housing market, the Wachter-Kroll Six Graph Model from real estate was used.
Based on this method of analysis, Havana can expect a significant increase in housing stock, an increase
in housing quality, a short-term spike in housing prices followed by a long-term decrease, initial mistakes
in housing construction levels, tax subsidies and direct grants to be effective tools for promoting housing
construction, a significant reduction in public expenditure, strong tenancy rights to be maintained, and
ideology to serve an important role in speeding up the transition to a stable housing market. Other
research that sheds some light on expected developments in Cuba is also discussed, such as research
that Socialist cities tend to require extensive renovation and repair due to inefficient placement and
construction of housing, research that popular sentiment toward Socialism in Cuba today is declining
which could accelerate housing privatization efforts, and research that the lack of a Cuban manufacturing
culture due to pronounced tertiarization may result in the exploitation of Cubans due to increasing
dependence on foreign corporations. The limitations of this housing privatization analysis are also
discussed.
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RESUMEN EJECUTIVO

Después de la caída de la Unión Soviética, Cuba enfrentó dificultades económicas
importantes y fue obligada a reinventar su modelo económico nacional. Para abordar este
obstáculo, Cuba se abrió a la inversión extranjera en bienes e inmuebles en 1995 y empezó a
desarrollar el turismo para crecer su economía. No obstante, el turismo es ideológicamente
inconsistente con los valores socialistas que forman la base del régimen castrista y requieren el
desarrollo de un sistema de derechos de propiedad. En 2011, el Decreto-Ley 288 se estableció y
autorizó la compra y venta de casas condicionado a tres condiciones por primera vez en la
historia del gobierno castrista: la transacción se pasó entre individuos, ocurrió sin la autorización
del gobierno, y se rigió por el precio del mercado. Esta ley - junto con otros acontecimientos
recientes en Cuba - sugiere que la privatización del sector de la vivienda pueda ocurrir en Cuba
en los próximos años.
¿Cómo sucede la privatización de la vivienda en Cuba? Específicamente, ¿cómo sucede
la privatización de la vivienda en la Habana, donde vive la mayoría de la gente y donde existe el
mayor potencial para el turismo? Las herramientas tradicionales de la disciplina de bienes raíces
no son suficientes para abordar esta problemática porque la privatización implica pasar de un
sistema de vivienda público a uno privado. Desafortunadamente, usar las herramientas
tradicionales de la disciplina de bienes raíces para analizar un sistema público de vivienda es,
como mínimo, inefectivo y probablemente inútil. Por esta razón, un método de análisis de
política comparada conocido como el diseño de sistemas más diversos (MDSD), una estrategia
comparativa que observa los resultados compartidos entre dos casos muy diferentes. Similitudes
descubiertas entre los dos casos según esta estrategia deben ser explicadas por el componente
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subyacente que se comparte entre los estudios de casos - privatización poscomunista de la
vivienda. Rusia y Alemania Oriental (las capitales de Moscú y Berlín Este) fueron elegidas como
los dos casos más distintos por varias razones: tamaños diferentes de la economía, diferentes
niveles de apoyo popular por el socialismo inmediatamente anterior a la privatización,
revoluciones producidas en el país o afuera, legados distintos del capitalismo, diferentes niveles
de desarrollo de la infraestructura política, diferentes esquemas de privatización, y diferentes
niveles de éxito después de la privatización.
Para comparar la privatización de la vivienda en Berlín Este y Moscú sistemáticamente,
tres criterios distintos fueron explorados: la política de vivienda e indicadores de vivienda, el
contexto político anterior y durante la privatización de la vivienda, y la ideología. Mediante la
exploración de estas tres categorías sistemáticamente, se puede lograr una comprensión más
fuerte de las similitudes y diferencias entre estos dos casos. Además, para contextualizar la
política de vivienda en términos del impacto que tuvieron en el emergente mercado inmobiliario,
se utilizó el Modelo Wachter-Kroll de la disciplina académica de bienes raíces.
Según este método de análisis, La Habana experimentará un aumento significativo de la
reservas de vivienda; un aumento de la calidad de la vivienda; un aumento de los precios de la
vivienda a corto plazo, seguido por una disminución a largo plazo; errores iniciales en los niveles
de construcción de viviendas; subsidios fiscales y subvenciones directas como instrumentos
eficaces para estimular la construcción de viviendas; una reducción significativa en el gasto
público; la continuación de un sistema que apoya fuertemente a los arrendatarios; y una
transición rápida hacia un mercado de vivienda estable. También, exploramos otras
investigaciones que pronostican el futuro de la vivienda en Cuba, tal como una investigación que
las ciudades socialistas por lo general requieren renovaciones y reparaciones extensas debido a
3

la distribución de viviendas ineficientes, una investigación que el sentimiento popular hacia el
socialismo en Cuba hoy en día está disminuyendo y como este fenómeno puede acelerar los
esfuerzos de privatización de la vivienda, y la investigación que le falta de una cultura de
fabricación en Cuba debido a la tercerización pronunciada tal vez resultará en la explotación de
los cubanos por una dependencia de las corporaciones extranjeras. También se discuten las
limitaciones de este análisis de la privatización de la vivienda.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Following the fall of the Soviet Union, Cuba faced significant economic hardship and
was forced to reinvent its national economic model. To face this obstacle, Cuba opened up to
foreign investment in in real estate in 1995 and used tourism to grow its economy. However,
tourism is ideologically inconsistent with the Socialist values that lay at the foundation of the
Castro regime and required the development of a system of property rights. In 2011, Decree-Law
288 was established, which authorized the buying and selling of homes between private citizens,
without government authorization, and at market prices for the first time in the history of the
Castro government. This law—coupled with other recent developments in Cuba—suggest that
privatization of the housing sector could occur in Cuba within the next few years.
What might housing privatization in Cuba—or specifically Havana, where the majority of
Cubans live and where there is the most potential for tourism—look like? Traditional real estate
tools are insufficient for addressing this question because housing privatization involves moving
from a public-oriented housing system to a market-oriented housing system, and real estate tools
work best with the latter. For this reason, a method of analysis from comparative politics known
as the Most Different Systems Design, a comparative strategy that looks for shared outcomes
between two very different case studies, was used. Uncovered similarities must be explained by
the underlying component that is shared between the case studies: in this instance, postCommunist housing privatization. Russia and East Germany (or specifically, their capital cities
of Moscow and East Berlin) were chosen as the two most different case studies for a number of
reasons: different economy sizes and natures, different levels of popular support for Socialism at
the time of privatization, homegrown versus foreign revolutions, different legacies of capitalism,
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different levels of development of political infrastructure, different privatization schemes, and
different levels of success post-facto.
To systematically compare East Berlin and Moscow, housing privatization was explored
along three different criteria: governmental housing policies and housing indicators, political
context preceding and during housing privatization, and ideology. By exploring these three broad
categories systematically, a more robust understanding of the similarities and differences
between these two case studies can be achieved. To contextualize government housing policies
in terms of the impact they made on the emerging housing market, the Wachter-Kroll Six Graph
Model from real estate was used.
Based on this method of analysis, Havana can expect a significant increase in housing
stock, an increase in housing quality, a short-term spike in housing prices followed by a longterm decrease, initial mistakes in housing construction levels, tax subsidies and direct grants to
be effective tools for promoting housing construction, a significant reduction in public
expenditure, strong tenancy rights to be maintained, and ideology to serve an important role in
speeding up the transition to a stable housing market. Other research that sheds some light on
expected developments in Cuba is also discussed, such as research that Socialist cities tend to
require extensive renovation and repair due to inefficient placement and construction of housing,
research that popular sentiment toward Socialism in Cuba today is declining which could
accelerate housing privatization efforts, and research that the lack of a Cuban manufacturing
culture due to pronounced tertiarization may result in the exploitation of Cubans due to
increasing dependence on foreign corporations. The limitations of this housing privatization
analysis are also discussed.

6

SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION

The preceding quarter-century has been a time of tremendous change for Cuba. Although
it may seem to be business as usual in Cuba to those living in the United States, Cuba has faced
tremendous internal turmoil since the fall of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. Because of the
US trade embargo and other reasons, Cuba has faced significant economic hardship in the past
25 years and has needed to reinvent its national economic model. To face these challenges, Cuba
opened up to real estate foreign investment in September 1995 through Law 77 and embraced
tourism as a way of bringing in much-needed hard currency, even though tourism is
ideologically inconsistent with the Socialist values that underpin the Castro regime.1 Although
Cuba today is still struggling to grow its economy, it appears that the nation has largely
weathered the economic storm it faced in the early 1990s.
Opening up to foreign tourism—although a necessary evil for the Castro regime—had
some difficult side effects. For most of the Castro regime, land and housing were not considered
commodities. Housing was provided to individuals as a social good to address the basic human
need of shelter, and land was collectively owned by all and leased out on behalf of the citizens.2
Instead, the late 1990s marked the first time in 40 years where housing projects appeared that did
not cater to social interests but rather the wishes and whimsies of wealthy foreigners tourists who
wanted to buy property.3 Although this was a lucrative endeavor for the Cuban government
which desperately needed to develop its economy, foreign investors and corporations could only
invest in Cuba with some semblance of a system of property rights. A Socialist economic system
1

Antonio Zamora. “The Impact of Cuba’s New Real Estate Laws on the Island and the Diaspora,” Cuba In
Transition 22 (2012), 208-211.
2
Mauricio Font and Carlos Riobó. Handbook of Contemporary Cuba: Economy, Politics, Civil Society, and
Globalization (Boulder: Paradigm, 2013), 126-130.
3
Mario Coyula. “Housing in Cuba,” DESIGNER/builder (2000), 7.
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that sought to eliminate private ownership was ideologically incompatible with market-oriented
corporations looking to turn a profit on privately-owned assets. This compromise began a
slippery slope—non-state (i.e. private) ownership is the first step towards a capitalist economy.
In November 2011, Decree-Law 288 was established, which further pushed Cuba
towards a market-oriented economic system. For the first time in decades, the law allowed for
the buying and selling of homes between private citizens, without government authorization, and
at market-determined (as opposed to government-determined) prices. This law procedurally and
ideologically contradicted the longstanding practice of permuta (i.e. exchange), where two
parties could trade homes as opposed to buying and selling housing. Decree-Law 288—
especially if it is coupled with the abolishment of government limitations on how many
residences can be owned—has laid the groundwork for a residential real estate market.4,5
Ideologically, the contradictions are mounting. On the surface, Cuba’s Socialist policy objectives
have remained the same, but Decree-Law 288 and other new policies by definition contradict
Socialist values. The permission of foreign investors to build profit-seeking tourism properties
and the creation of a residential real estate proto-market inherently imply that housing is a
commodity and not a social good. Furthermore, market-determined real estate prices and the
lifted restriction on housing sales contradict equitable distribution of housing and instead
contribute to income inequality—a system of haves and have-nots. These new policies have
started to reverse the Socialist progress that the Castro regime has made over the last 50 years.
This—coupled with widespread popular sentiment that a market-based housing system would

4

Antonio Zamora. “The Impact of Cuba’s New Real Estate Laws on the Island and the Diaspora,” Cuba In
Transition 22 (2012), 208-211.
5
"Decreto-Ley 288," Gaceta Oficial 35 (2011), 359-373.
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result in better housing outcomes6—suggests that further acceleration towards a market-oriented
economic system is probable. Because of its close connection to the property rights system that is
necessary for foreign tourism to succeed in Cuba, market privatization in Cuba is likely to
happen in the housing sector first, a process known as housing privatization.
But what will housing privatization in Cuba look like? More specifically, what will
housing privatization look like in Havana, where the majority of Cubans live and where the most
potential for tourism dollars lies? Will housing privatization be successful? Who will benefit, and
who will suffer? A number of interesting questions arise as we think about Cuba’s imminent
transition to a market-oriented economy, particularly in the housing sector. For many questions,
only time will tell what Cuban housing privatization will look like. Nonetheless, scholars have a
plethora of case studies to look at of formerly Communist governments privatizing the housing
sector—that is, housing privatization in the post-Communist context. By analyzing postCommunist housing privatization in the comparative perspective, lessons can be learned about
what housing privatization may look like in Cuba: what challenges will be faced, what pitfalls to
avoid, and what opportunities should be taken advantage of.

HOW CAN WE PREDICT CUBAN HOUSING PRIVATIZATION?
Predicting housing privatization—a complicated, multi-faceted process—seems like it
would be a difficult endeavor to tackle. Countless different factors should affect how successful
housing privatization turns out in the post-Communist context. According to the World Bank,
there are at least 44 different indicators needed to compare different housing outcomes once a
market-oriented housing system is approaching equilibrium (i.e. a steady state of met demand

6

Jared Michael Genova. "¡Hasta La Utopía Siempre! Conflicting Utopian Ideologies in Havana’s Late Socialist
Housing Market." (2012): 17-44.
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and supply). Housing privatization—a complex process where a public-oriented housing system
becomes a market-oriented housing system—is precisely so difficult because nations must
muddle through a series of disequilibria: periods where supply and demand do not correspond. If
44 indicators are needed to compare stable housing markets, how can it be possible to compare
unstable, messy, housing privatization transitions?
Even within nations, housing privatization affects different classes of cities distinctly. In
Cuba, the Communist government frequently overinvested in rural locales and second-tier cities
at the expense of capital cities. In East Germany, however, the opposite occurred; East Berlin
received the lion’s share of investment dollars in order to maintain the façade of strong economic
growth in the Eastern Bloc.7 Housing privatization helped ease these market distortions, but
clearly this resulted in different housing privatization processes for capital cities, secondary
cities, and the rural countryside, even within just one nation.8,9
Despite these many differences, housing privatization in the post-Communist context
does seem to occur in roughly the same way. Although each nation has its own unique factors
and context, housing outcomes tend to converge, particularly with regard to specific
characteristics and attributes. Although methods of analysis from the academic discipline of real
estate are valuable for predicting housing outcomes based on data, important indicators, and
policy classifications, housing privatization is too multi-faceted, complex, and messy of a
process to be easily dissected with these tools. Instead, to determine these characteristics, this
paper aims to use a method of analysis from comparative politics known as the Most Different

7

David Clapham, ed. Housing Privatization in Eastern Europe. (London: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1996), 4345.
8
Claus Michelsen and Dominik Weiß. “What Happened to the East German Housing Market? A Historical
Perspective on the Role of Public Funding.” Post-Communist Economies 22 (2010), 387-409.
9
Jill Hamberg. Under Construction: Housing Policy in Revolutionary Cuba (New York: Center for Cuban Studies,
1986), 1-10.
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Systems Design, a comparative strategy that looks for shared outcomes between two very
different case studies. If similarities are discovered, then the differences between these two case
studies must not explained by their differences, suggesting general trends that can be applied to
other case studies. Similarities found between two radically different examples of housing
privatization in the post-Communist context could then be extrapolated to Cuba.
Perhaps the most dissimilar examples of post-Communist housing privatization are East
Germany and Russia. Firstly, the two nations differed greatly in terms of the size and nature of
their economies.10 Secondly, popular support for Communism differed wildly between the two
nations. In Russia, Socialism was still a relatively legitimate ideology due to its nearly centurylong presence, whereas Socialism had lost its popular support due to a number of political gaffes
by the time of housing privatization in East Germany. Thirdly, the point of origin of the
revolution was different between the two nations. Russia’s Socialist revolution grew from an
indigenous grassroots movement and fundamentally altered the makeup of society, unlike in East
Germany, where the Socialist revolution occurred through a Soviet takeover. Fourthly, each
nation had different levels of experience with market-oriented systems prior to privatization. In
Russia, the revolution took place while Russia was largely rural and pre-industrial, and it lasted
for nearly a century.11 In contrast, a somewhat robust market-based system had developed prior
to the rise of East Germany, so there was more infrastructure present for a switch to capitalism
post-facto. Fifthly, the two nations used different privatization schemes. In Russia, a mass
privatization scheme was used and entailed the distribution of shares to the public. Typically, this
involved breaking up state-owned enterprises and selling the assets of these corporations piece-

10

Hilary Appel. A New Capitalist Order: Privatization & Ideology in Russia and Eastern Europe (Pittsburgh, PA:
University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005), 15.
11
Andrew Scott Barnes. Owning Russia: The Struggle Over Factories, Farms, and Power (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 2006), 20-27.
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by-piece. In East Germany, the government used the reunification method of privatization. Law
stipulated that enterprises needed to be sold “as is” and as a going concern. Joint ventures and
raising new capital were not permitted. This was in contrast to most other nations, where joint
ventures and selling assets piecemeal were common strategies for investors to develop profitable
new corporations, although these phenomena did leave poorly performing assets with the state.
Sixthly, by the time of housing privatization Russia and East Germany had developed finance
and regulatory systems to a different degree. Because East Germany was merged with West
Germany, East Germany was able to take advantage of West Germany’s legislative system, its
longstanding legal code, and its robust financial and human resources. In contrast, Russia at the
time of housing privatization was still struggling to develop a regulatory system and the political
infrastructure that is vital to a swift and speedy transition.12 Seventhly, the performance of
housing privatization in Russia and East Germany was very different. Russia fared poorly
through the housing privatization process. In a study comparing the development of housing
market systems in reforming Socialist economies, Russia performed the absolute last along five
different categories: market performance, overall indicators, fiscal indicators, financial
indicators, and public/private roles (a category that considers ownership concentration, private
housing production levels, land market controls, and maintenance responsibilities).13 In contrast,
East German privatization is considered a poster child of post-Communist housing privatization.
Privatization in East Germany was quite successful and is considered an exception to the rule in
post-Socialist privatization.14

12

Andreja Böhm and Marko Simoneti, eds. Privatization in Central and Eastern Europe 1991 (Ljubljana, Slovenia:
Central and Eastern European Privatization Network, 1992), 20-22, 173-183.
13
Robert M. Buckleyand and Sasha Tsenkova. "Housing Market Systems in Reforming Socialist Economies:
Comparative Indicators of Performance and Policy," European Journal of Housing Policy 1, no. 2 (2001), 266-273.
14
Andreja Böhm and Marko Simoneti, eds. Privatization in Central and Eastern Europe 1992 (Ljubljana, Slovenia:
Central and Eastern European Privatization Network, 1993), 28-33, 122-139.
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METHODOLOGY
To reiterate, this paper will use a method of analysis from comparative politics known as
the Most Different Systems Design. This comparative strategy searches for shared outcomes
between two very different—almost archetypal--case studies. Similarities discovered between
these two radically distinct examples are presumed to remain unexplained by the differences
between the cases. Thus, the similarities could be extrapolated to other case studies of postCommunist housing privatization: in this example, Cuba.
East Germany and Russia have been identified as the two very different systems to be
used in this analysis. However, it is just as important to identify what factors will be considered:
how will different outcomes be measured and compared? To determine the similarities between
these two different case studies, this paper will look at three different categories of information:
governmental housing policies and housing indicators; political context preceding and during
housing privatization; and ideology. By understanding these categories and their change over the
course of housing privatization, lessons can be learned about the general trajectory of nations
undergoing housing reform after Communist rule. Although East Germany and Russia started
from very different origins in terms of housing indicators, economic factors, political
infrastructure, and more, both nations experienced housing privatization in the post-Communist
context. For this reason, similar trends in how these nations changed over time are relevant and
useful for extrapolation, as opposed to what specific outcomes were achieved.
An exploration of what governmental housing policies were passed during the transition
period yields information about how regimes tackle the massive and thorny problem of housing
privatization through government initiatives. Although there are myriad ways of transitioning the
housing sector to a market system, any observed similarities between these two case studies
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could suggest that governments tend to address this problem in a similar fashion. Governmental
housing policies include initiatives such as urban renewal programs, social housing programs,
direct grants for construction, tax subsidies to homeowners, tax deductions to private financing,
and much more. These policies stimulate economic activity and housing investment by
facilitating and subsidizing the involvement of certain parties (and conversely, impeding and
disincentivizing the involvement of other parties). In addition to exploring which kinds of
policies are generally implemented, this paper will aim to contextualize these policies through
the Wachter-Kroll Six-Graph model, a generalized housing model that dynamically represents
the interaction between the market for housing services and the market for housing assets. This
contextualization adds further detail to which kinds of policies are passed. Policies can not only
be grouped categorically (e.g. social housing programs, tax subsidies) but also in terms of what
their impact is on the housing market (e.g. reduces the cap rate, subsidizes construction firms).
Put anotherw ay, these policies will be characterized through an exploration into how housing
indicators and economic factors—such as GDP per capita, population, inflation, housing stock,
new housing starts, and households per dwelling unit—changed over time. As previously
mentioned, East Germany and Russia did not share similar values for these indicators preceding
housing privatization. Nonetheless, trends in how these values changed over time could reveal
useful insight about the housing privatization process after the end of Communism in these
nations. As with governmental housing policy, the magnitude and direction of these changes
alone can be useful information, but greater context adds detail that colors our understanding of
the housing privatization process in the post-Communist context. The Wachter Kroll Six-Graph
model will be used to understand how these housing indicators fit in the larger context of the
housing market and to begin to understand how the changes in these values could relate to the
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implementation of governmental housing policy, housing infrastructure, and national economic
and monetary policy.
Understanding the political context preceding and during the housing privatization
process is another useful tool for expanding our understanding of this phenomenon. All of the
selected nations share the unenviable task of moving from a state-planned economy to a freemarket system for one of the largest sectors of every economy: housing and housing
construction. Furthermore, housing policy is closely linked to the competitiveness of economy
compared to others across the globe.15 For this reason, controlling the housing privatization
process is a high-stakes game that creates clear winners and losers, as with other types of
privatization. Understanding the political happenings directly around the time of housing
privatization—such as the material interests of key economic and political stakeholders—could
shed some light on general challenges that formerly Communist nations will face when
privatizing housing.
Finally, ideology was chosen as a potential determinant of housing privatization. Did
preexisting ideologies have an impact on the housing privatization process, and did ideologies
develop during the housing privatization transition? Mainstream literature on post-Communist
privatization typically focuses on the material interests of key political and economic actors.
However, this approach alone does not adequately explain privatization efforts in the former
Eastern Bloc.16 In the early 1990s, the world community almost unanimously agreed with rapid
post-Communist privatization through mass privatization programs, despite no historical
precedent for privatization on a nationwide scale and despite widespread criticism of these

15

Susan Wachter. “International Housing Comparisons: Introduction and Indicators” (presentation, International
Housing Comparisons course, Philadelphia, PA, January 9, 2013).
16
Hilary Appel. A New Capitalist Order: Privatization & Ideology in Russia and Eastern Europe (Pittsburgh, PA:
University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005), 7.
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efforts just a decade later.17 Furthermore, empirical research on privatization relies on the
presence of clearly-defined property structures and transformative mechanisms. Given the high
degree of uncertainty following the post-Communist regime changes, key stakeholders appeared
to have little insight into which initiatives and measures would best advance their particular goals
or economic interests. In her groundbreaking book A New Capitalist Order, Hilary Appel
suggests that one crucial shortcoming of the standard empirical approach is the lack of attention
paid to the forces that shaped how the preferences of stakeholders formed and to the forces that
determined how the distribution of power was perceived.18 Appel argues that understanding
ideology begins to fill this critical void in understanding the privatization process, with ideology
defined in the Hayekian sense as a belief system held by individuals but shared by many in a
society, such as anti-Communism, pro-Westernism, nationalism, or economic liberalism.19 Appel
explains that ideology drove privatization in Eastern Europe and Russia by determining the
initial design of property rights, shaping the definition of interests and distribution of power
among groups in society, and influencing how policymakers built support for the implementation
process. Collectively, compatibility between policy initiatives and the predominant ideology in
society during privatization affected the ease of implementation and the distortion of
privatization programs over time.20 Although Appel’s analysis focuses specifically on an analysis
of Czech and Russian large-scale privatization, her findings can with some work be expanded to
address housing privatization in East Germany and Russia, especially because political support
for members of former ruling parties differed substantially across all of the former Eastern Bloc
17

Hilary Appel. A New Capitalist Order: Privatization & Ideology in Russia and Eastern Europe (Pittsburgh, PA:
University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005), 4.
18
Hilary Appel. A New Capitalist Order: Privatization & Ideology in Russia and Eastern Europe (Pittsburgh, PA:
University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005), 12.
19
Hilary Appel. A New Capitalist Order: Privatization & Ideology in Russia and Eastern Europe (Pittsburgh, PA:
University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005), 8.
20
Hilary Appel. A New Capitalist Order: Privatization & Ideology in Russia and Eastern Europe (Pittsburgh, PA:
University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005), 7.
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nations. In Russia, the Communists maintained a good deal of popular support and many even
maintained their positions in political office. However, in East Germany popular support for the
Communists eroded long before reunification occurred. This paper will begin to scratch the
surface of exploring how ideology facilitated or hindered the housing privatization process in
these two countries, with the intent of applying this to the Cuban situation.
Collectively, an exploration into these three categories will yield a wealth of information
about the specifics of the housing privatization programs in East Germany and Russia, two
radically different case studies for housing privatization in the post-Communist context. The
similarities uncovered through this analysis could to begin to paint the picture of what Cuban
housing privatization might look like a few years down the line.
Finally, it is difficult to draw broad generalizations about housing privatizations within
one nation. Particularly in Communist countries, housing services were treated very differently
in capital cities, second-tier cities, and the rural countryside. Logically, housing reform would
occur differently across these geographies as well. To control for the fact that housing
privatization on a national level would affect capital cities, secondary cities, and rural areas
differently, this paper will specifically look at East Berlin and Moscow, the respective capital
cities of the former German Democratic Republic and Russia. This choice should allow for an
understanding of what housing privatization may look like in Havana.

A PRIMER ON USING THE WACHTER-KROLL SIX GRAPH MODEL
Without context, determining the relevant government housing policies, economic
policies, and data on housing indicators provides insufficient information about post-Communist
housing privatization. Without an overarching framework, it is difficult to interpret this
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information to create a narrative about housing privatization in the intermediate term; this is
especially useful as it begins to suggest causation and correlation between different factors and
begins to rank which factors are more important than others. For this reason, the Wachter-Kroll
Six Graph Model is used extensively in the paper to provide context to not only the long-term
equilibria implied by housing policy changes but also the short-term disequilibria as well. The
Wachter-Kroll Six Graph Model is explained and explored in another section.21
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SECTION 2: REAL ESTATE THEORY ON WHAT HAPPENS IN HOUSING MARKETS

Understanding the Cuban housing situation in the present global context is difficult
without an understanding of how housing sectors function at a high level. Since the fall of the
Soviet Union, the vast majority of economies have begun the transition towards market-based
housing systems.22 Cuba is quite exceptional in its current rejection of market-based housing
systems. However, Cuba’s housing policy nonetheless aims to address the same issue that all
housing policies seek to fix: how can we house our citizens in the most effective way possible?
Of course, the definition of effective used therein can vary considerably. Effective can mean
efficient (predominant in market-focused nations), equitable (predominant in Socialist nations
such as Cuba), or directed at a given sociopolitical motive, among other definitions. Typically,
the definition of effective usually involves some combination of all three factors. This definition
varies greatly based on a nation’s orientation towards free markets or central planning, among
other economic, political, ideological, and historical motives.23

WHAT MAKES HOUSING POLICY IMPORTANT?
What makes housing policies important? Why are government policies on housing
different than government policies on other goods? Government policy on housing is exceptional
because housing itself is a unique good. Housing differs from other economic commodities for a
wide swath of reasons: housing is a complex commodity, housing is fixed in space, housing is
the major investment of households, housing units have extremely long lifetimes, housing is a
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merit good, choice of housing affects location, homeownership access impacts important
socioeconomic and political factors, and housing is strongly related to the national
macroeconomy. Although many commodities may have one or more of these distinctive features,
only housing presents the special combination of all of them. This combination of attributes has
implications on structural aspects of the housing market and on housing transition..24,25
Housing is a complex commodity because it is complex to evaluate, produce, manage,
and maintain. These qualities also make it complicated for suppliers and demanders to trade it
efficiently.26 Housing is a heterogeneous good: a variety of residences with distinguishable
features—architectural style, number of square feet, number of floors, number of bedrooms,
number of bathrooms, presence of a backyard, and much, much more—can all provide the same
function. Thus, a variety of different attributes must be considered to evaluate, characterize, and
price a dwelling or building. In a market-based system focused on efficiency, households, tenants
and landlords must gather and process a great deal of information to make housing market
choices that maximize utility or profit.27 In centrally-planned economies such as Cuba,
government agencies must gather this information in order to make housing market allocations
that achieve their stated aims, such as fair and equitable distribution. Secondly, space constraints
are an important consideration for housing as a good. This fixity constraint necessitates that
choosing housing implies a choice of neighborhood,28 a choice of access to jobs, and a choice of
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access to goods and local services, such as shopping centers and schools. 29 Thirdly, housing is
the major investment for households. Housing is expensive to produce, own and maintain. For
this reason, housing is generally the most significant investment for households and is typically a
substantial fraction of household budgets.30 Ultimately, this makes housing unique as an asset
class as it is both a basic consumption and an investment good.”31 This characteristic makes
renting or leasing critical for proper functioning of a housing system. Fourthly, the durability of
housing is measured in decades. Housing units have extremely long lifetimes, which implies that
new construction provides only a small fraction of the total quantity of housing services and that
construction activity is extremely sensitive to minor changes in housing demand. Moreover, the
implications of local investment activity affect the physical environment for a long time.32
Fifthly, housing is a merit good, or a private good which is publicly supplied because it is
deemed important that an appropriate quantity is consumed.33 As a society, we care that all
members of society have adequate housing, because shelter is a basic human need. Provision of
housing must not only consider what is economically efficient but also what is equitable and
just.34 Housing is a necessity for all individuals, although there tend to exist many substitution
possibilities within the set of housing services. In the case that individuals are unable to achieve
shelter through the formal housing sector, they may pursue housing services through the informal
housing sector by living in slums or shantytowns, building their own residence, or doubling up
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with an existing household (e.g. moving in with parents or relatives).35 Shelter as a fundamental
human need constitutes a major reason why housing is distinct from other economic goods.
Sixthly, housing policy has implications on important socioeconomic and political factors. For
example, access to homeownership—a key plank for all housing policies—impacts wealth
distribution, who becomes a have and a have-not, and political stability of a society.36,37 Finally,
housing is strongly related to the national macroeconomy. Housing and housing construction
constitute a large part of the economy and are a large percent of government expenditures.
Moreover, housing policy is closely linked to the competitiveness of economy compared to
others across the globe.38
The combination of these attributes makes housing unique from other economic
commodities and has implications on structural aspects of the housing market and on housing
transitions.39 Housing complexity makes information gathering an important part of pricing and
evaluating housing as a good, and information asymmetry is thus a significant issue in housing
markets. Housing fixity and complexity mean that housing transaction costs are very high in
terms of both monetary and psychic costs. Fixity and asset longevity result in a scenario where
housing investment decisions made even centuries prior can have a long-range consequences on
the entire future course of geographical areas.
Given the expense and investment involved in the creation of housing, housing finance
systems are critical to understanding housing policy. In the case of Socialist nations with planned
35
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economies, housing finance systems do not exist in the sense of a market for housing financing
with banks, financial institutions, and other private lenders involved in contributing funds.
Instead, housing finance is mixed with government and state-enterprise budgets. Furthermore,
construction organizations in these economies cannot differentiate between housing financing
(i.e. banking loans at competitive market rates) and housing subsidies (i.e. fiscal grants
originating from the government), which results in complex market distortions.40 Given the sheer
expense and investment required for a market-based housing system, some form of housing
financing system is almost mandatory for proper functioning. Nonetheless, the characteristics of
individual housing finance systems differ considerably from country to country. Research by
Bertrand Renaud categorizes housing finance systems by their dominant characteristics into six
different types. These six types are: undeveloped housing finance systems, missing housing
finance systems in former centrally planned economies, fragmented and unstable housing finance
systems, segregated but stable housing finance systems, sound and integrating housing finance
systems, and advanced housing finance systems. The first of these systems are undeveloped
systems, which are found in regions such as sub-Saharan Africa where economic growth is
dependent on a few export commodities, per capita income is low, and basic financial
infrastructure is practically nonexistent. Informal financing such as social financing from friends
and family is prevalent and virtually necessary for any housing construction in countries with
undeveloped housing finance systems. In many of these countries, a strong push for the
development of commercial housing finance is often premature because basic financial
institutions are barely in place and not strong enough to provide for the entire system. Instead,
priority should go first to the development of solid housing markets through urban laws and
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housing-facing policies and practices. Rather than focusing on housing specifically, public
efforts towards the extension of basic urban infrastructure and the supply of serviced urban land
and land titling are likely to have a greater initial impact.41 The second of these housing systems
are missing systems in former centrally planned economies, which face a number of challenges.
Like in undeveloped housing systems, the absence of a commercial housing finance system is a
significant challenge. Moreover in many of these countries (save for Russia) the economies are
not fully urbanized, further exacerbating the issue. The majority of these Post-Socialist
economies suffer from the following shortcomings, despite making considerable progress in
recent years: weak private property rights; a legacy of confusion between housing financing and
housing subsidies; still undergoing the process of privatization, the rent reform process, and the
creation of a legal framework for real estate, the creation of legal and regulatory reforms of the
banking system before commercial housing finance can be put in place; and a dualistic housing
system with a large, stagnant state system overshadowing a small, but often rapidly growing
private system. Results in terms of a housing finance system have been wanting. Private housing
finance remains limited, experimental, and for high-income groups. Furthermore, a coordinated
improvement of both primary mortgage lenders (e.g. banks and other financial institutions that
originate housing loans) and secondary market facilities (a financial after-market on which these
loans can be traded) is essential for safe and sound expansion in these housing finance systems.42
This type of market activity will allow for the expansion of housing finance availability for
citizens and will tie housing finance to credit markets, allowing households to borrow at lower
interest rates. However, this linkage could have negative repercussions. Academics such as
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Susan Wachter believe that the linkage of housing finance and global credit markets resulted in
an explosion of the use of leverage resulted in the 2007 housing crisis.43 The third of the housing
finance systems are fragmented and unstable systems. These systems result from high inflation
and macroeconomic instability combined with directed credit and financial repression. These
systems were common in Argentina, Brazil, and other parts of Latin America in the 1980s.
Housing finance in these nations tends to be very small in relation to GDP as a result of recurrent
macroeconomic mismanagement and/or external shocks. These nations are typically marked by
the dominant role of government in housing, typically caused by severe income inequality.
Essential components of long-lasting reform for these countries include the separation of
subsidies from finance and the targeting of subsidies for social housing.44

HOUSING POLICY IMPLICATIONS ON NATIONS AND MOTIVES FOR HOUSING
POLICY CHOICE
The choice of housing policy has far-reaching implications on a nation. Firstly, the
execution of housing policies “affects the physical appearance and spatial development of
metropolitan areas, the economic well-being of households, and their social environments.”45
Secondly, since housing is a necessity for all individuals, housing policy affects all citizens in a
given nation, and the distribution of housing is an important issue for producers and consumers
and by extension politicians and government officials. Thirdly, the longevity of housing assets
means that housing policy can only be changed slowly over time, as even large changes in new
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commitments to housing subsidy increase total housing stock over a long time horizon. Fourthly,
housing policy has implications for and must be coordinated with many other important
objectives of economic and social policy such as macroeconomic stabilization, social welfare,
appropriate land use, economic development, and more. Fifthly, housing policy is difficult to
design and may be difficult to evaluate in many cases. This characteristic is exacerbated by the
long-term perspective needed to analyze housing policy decisions and “in part because
uncertainty is magnified over long time horizons.”46 Choice of housing policy has substantial
long-term ramifications on the direction of a nation and its economy.
What are the different types of policy instruments that governments can use? Instruments
of housing policy can roughly be categorized into three categories: demand-oriented (which
includes housing allowances and tax exemptions), supply-oriented (which includes planning and
land use policy, building codes, zoning regulations, construction subsidies, and interest rate
subsidies), and direct market intervention (which includes rent controls, price controls, rationing
systems, queuing systems, and tenant security regulations). Demand-oriented instruments distort
existing housing demand, supply-oriented instruments distort the long-term housing supply
levels, and instruments of direct market intervention typically have a rapid impact on housing
supply and/or demand in the short- (or immediate-) term, although when these policies are
maintained over a longer time horizon the ramifications are felt over the long term. The exact
nature of how these instruments impact housing demand and supply is beyond the scope of this
paper, but the Wachter-Kroll framework explored later in the paper is a wonderful tool for
analyzing this phenomenon.47
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Why do housing policies vary so widely from nation to nation? Although all nations seek
to have an effective policy, the definition of effective can differ greatly based on desire
economic, political, and social objectives. These motives can be generally summarized as
directed at efficiency, equitability, or a specific social or political aim. Efficiency motives for
housing policies are common in market-focused housing systems and aim to promote allocative
efficiency in the economy. Equitability or equity objectives aim to provide suitable living
conditions for all citizens and are closely related to an equal income distribution objective.
Finally, social and political motives comprise a third objective for housing policies. Social
motives tend to be especially evident with regulation linked to housing policy. For example,
regulation on minimum health and safety requirements for households “codify the social
character of urban life” and represent social norms on what should be considered adequate
housing. Housing policy can also be used to further political ideology. For example, Socialist
political parties often aim to tailor housing policy to minimize income inequality and divisions
between different classes.48 These parties tend to conceive of housing not as an economic
commodity but rather as a merit good that should be provided to all citizens, lest citizens
underestimate the importance of decent
housing for themselves or be unable to attain it due to wasteful consumption.49 Differences
between countries can thus be quite stark. In the United States, tenants can be evicted on the
basis of delinquent payments.50 However, in Brazil, tenants can only be evicted through
protracted judicial proceedings, even at the end of the lease period. The average length of this

48

Björn Hårsman and John M. Quigley. "Housing Markets and Housing Institutions in a Comparative Context." In
Housing Markets and Housing Institutions: An International Comparison, (Springer Netherlands, 1991), 4-10.
49
Harry Rele and Guido Steen. "Measuring Housing Subsidies: Distortionary and Distributional Effects in the
Netherlands." Fiscal Studies 24, no. 3 (2003), 319.
50
“Anti-Discrimination Law is Pro-Tenant,” Global Property Guide, February 2008,
http://www.globalpropertyguide.com/North-America/United-States/Landlord-and-Tenant

27

process is 120 days.51 Although these different objectives vary widely, they are not mutually
exclusive. Generally, housing policies are directed towards a blend of motives.
Of course, understanding the implications and motives of housing policy is just a
component of the overall story. Academic research from scholars of real estate shows that
housing policy can have dramatic implications for national housing markets. Typically, Socialist
nations with planned economies have nationalized housing systems that aim to more equitably
provide housing to all. These nations typically conceive of housing as a fundamental human right
and oppose conception of housing as an economic good to be sold and traded.52 In the case of
Cuba, for example, this meant high levels of homeownership, low (and in some cases
nonexistent) rent costs, and increased provision of higher quality housing to the most
marginalized by society, especially rural and agrarian populations.53 However, this type of
system generally has drawbacks as compared to market-based housing systems. For example,
Socialist nations with planned economies tend to have similar housing systems that suffer from a
number of common features: high levels of state ownership, trivial rents charged to users and
poor maintenance of public housing stock, overwhelming dependence on state financing in new
construction, strong state monopolies over production leading to low-quality housing stock that
provide poor housing services, the absence of land markets resulting in distorted land use.54 As
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an example of the last point, this can mean the overbuilding of high-quality housing too far from
the city; this housing often goes unused after housing privatization.55
The aforementioned concerns, when coupled with macroeconomic distortions and rapidly
growing subsidies, ultimately directed Russia and East Germany away from centrally planned
housing models to market-based housing systems. What explains the negative outcomes of
centrally planned systems? Why does the transition to market appear to be a necessity and not
really a choice for Socialist countries? The answers stem from the singular characteristics of
housing discussed previously, especially as they pertain to what Marxist analysts call
“commodity housing” as well as the administrative shortcomings of a planned economy.56
Although housing is not very complex to produce, it is perhaps the most complex economic good
to properly analyze, distribute, manage, maintain. As previously mentioned, housing is a durable
good that lasts for decades, and housing is quite heterogeneous in terms of design, age, available
services, and more. Moreover, housing value is strongly dependent on the quality, social services
and infrastructure of the neighborhood where housing is located. Furthermore, the high costs to
produce housing, the complex nature of housing transactions, and the characteristic of housing as
a fundamental basic need (i.e. shelter) make it the subject of extensive financial, fiscal and
physical regulation by governments. These characteristics of housing explain why indirect policy
instruments operating in decentralized, locally regulated housing markets work much better than
direct, centralized interventions by the state in raising the efficiency of the sector, and meeting
the needs and preferences of the population. Furthermore, from a macroeconomic perspective,
the system of state financing usually creates allocation distortions, deadweight losses, and
destabilizing subsidies. Over the long run, this results in severe macroeconomic distortions and
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rapidly growing subsidies that make a centrally planned housing system fundamentally
unsustainable.57

UNDERSTANDING HOUSING OUTCOMES: THE RELEVANT INDICATORS
A discussion of housing policy would be incomplete without exploring housing
outcomes. Given that housing is a heterogeneous good, housing transactions are expensive and
complex, and the housing market is such a large portion of a nation’s GDP, understanding
housing outcomes in nations and the institutions that develop to support housing markets is a
difficult task. The following sections will aim to explore how housing outcomes can be measured
and what frameworks can be used to systematically evaluate these outcomes. Put another way,
we will discuss what indicators should be considered when trying to compare different housing
outcomes and what academic theories can tell us about those outcomes.
There are a variety of different indicators that should be considered when trying to
compare housing outcomes. These indicators can be thought of under two different general
categories. Housing context indicators reveal the context of the housing market. By
understanding the climate for economic growth across all economic sectors, the fundamental
basis of what the housing market might look like can be understood. These indicators include
macroeconomic indicators (e.g. inflation, interest rates, access to jobs, and income per capita),
legal institutions, urbanization, and availability of public services. The second category of
indicators is housing-specific indicators. At a high level, these include housing supply (e.g. space
per capita, rooms per capita, housing stock, housing starts), housing finance (access to, how
much, and under what conditions), housing institutions (presence of credit bureaus, housing
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legislation, housing rulings in court, and regulatory systems), primacy, informality, affordability
(rent as a percent of income, construction cost as a percent of income, land prices as a function of
density), quality, safety, permanence, homelessness, home ownership, and systemic volatility of
the housing finance system.58 According to the Housing Indicators Program, a World Bank
program that sought to characterize important housing indicators in the early 1990s, an
exhaustive list of useful indicators includes: GNP per capita, national level of urbanization,
inflation over the previous decade, country financial depth, capital population, house price to
income ratio, rent to income ratio, house price appreciate as a percent, down-market penetration,
housing credit portfolio, credit to value ratio, mortgage rate to prime rate difference in basis
points, mortgage to deposit difference in basis points, mortgage arrears rate, owner occupancy,
public housing stock, unauthorized housing, squatter housing, homelessness, floor space per
person, persons per room, households per dwelling unit, permanent structures, water connection,
journey to work in minutes, annual new household formation, residential mobility, vacancy rate,
housing starts, housing investment as a percent, industrial concentration, import share of
construction, construction cost, construction skill ratio, average construction time in months,
land development multiplier, land conversion multiplier, infrastructure expenditures per capita,
urban density, minimum city lot size, salable land ratio, extent of rent control, permits delay, and
foreclosure delay. Ideally, all of this information would be listed in our case studies, which
would allow for a powerful comparative perspective on different city case studies. However, due
to a lack of data, this outcome is difficult to achieve. Instead, this paper attempts to comment at a
high level on ten different categories of important values: socioeconomic context, housing
prices, housing finance, housing tenure, housing quality, housing market dynamics, housing
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production and investment, housing construction, residential land development, and the
regulatory environment.59

UNDERSTANDING HOUSING OUTCOMES: WACHTER-KROLL’S SIX-GRAPH
MODEL
While determining relevant indicators allows us to make comparisons between different
nations and their corresponding housing policies, it does not allow for an understanding of how
the housing market functions. Put another way, what forces tie housing policies and housing
outcomes? How can we understand which levers result in different outcomes?
One framework developed to address this question is Wachter and Kroll’s six-graph
model, which dynamically represents the interaction between the market for housing as a service
and the market for housing as a financial investment. Alternately, the six-graph model attempts
to tie housing as a fundamental need for individuals and households with housing as a traded
asset in the capital markets. It is important to note that this model aims to understand the real
estate space market and real estate asset (i.e. capital) markets, and thus its utility is different
when trying to understand housing systems that are not based on market systems (i.e. public
housing systems). For these systems, the six-graph model allows for a better understanding of
what a market-efficient outcome might look like. For example, the six-graph model can provide
a reference point for what a market-efficient amount of housing starts could be. Specifically,
Wachter and Kroll’s six-graph model is unique in that it allows for a dynamic understanding of
how the real estate market moves from disequilibrium towards equilibrium outcomes.60 For this
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reason, the Wachter-Kroll six-graph model is a more useful model than the DiPasquale-Wheaton
four-graph model it was developed from.,61
The top three graphs in the six-graph model represent the market for real estate space.
Assuming adequate maintenance, each unit of space can produce shelter and other housing
services in perpetuity. The market represented by the top three graphs is not the market for these
structures, but rather the market for the services produced by these spaces. Tenants are charged
rent per unit of a given quality per period in exchange for these services; in the long-term, this
rent must cover the cost of production for these services. In this model, tenants that own their
own housing (i.e. owner-occupied housing) are considered to be renting to themselves. Graph 1
demonstrates the market short-run and long-run demand and supply curves for rental services.62
The total demand for space in Graph 1 is typically formulated as a function of disposable
income, the number of households in a given area, and rent. It is useful to note that a number of
housing policy instruments such as rent control, subsidies that increase disposable household
income (i.e. supplementary housing assistance), and urban renewal programs can affect the
demand for housing. One important lever for the rent market is the tax rate; all else equal, a tax
reduction would lead to an increase in real estate prices due to the increase in disposable
income.63 Graph 2 shows the average long-run cost curve for a representative provider of rental
services (i.e. “rental firms” such as REITs, property managers, small-scale owners/operators, and
owner-occupants who provide services to themselves). Graph 3 represents demand for new

61

Denise DiPasquale and William C. Wheaton. “The Property and Capital Markets.” Urban Economics and Real
Estate Markets. Vol. 23, no. 7. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1996).
62
Susan M. Wachter and Timothy J. Kroll. “Real Estate Capital and Space Markets: The Simple Analytics.” (1996),
1-2.
63
Claus Michelsen and Dominik Weiß. “What Happened to the East German Housing Market? A Historical
Perspective on the Role of Public Funding.” Post-Communist Economies 22 (2010), 391-392.

33

investment in real estate.64 This graph associates the number of new construction starts each
period with the net operating income (NOI) or returns on real estate.65
The bottom three graphs, in contrast, represent the market for real estate assets (i.e.
capital market). These assets represent the structures that provide housing services.66 Graph 4
shows the market short-run and long-run demand and supply curves for these assets. Note that
the cap rate (i)—the expected risk-adjusted interest rate from real estate, which represents the
expected income a property can generate—can be calculated here by taking the rent price in
Graph 1 and dividing by the asset price in Graph 4. The cap rate is determined exogenously and
depends on the rate of return on all other assets and implicitly interest rates, risk, and inflation.
All else equal, a drop in the cap rate would result in an increase in rent level in Graph 1.67 Graph
5 shows the average long-run cost curve for a representative construction firm (i.e. “developers”
or construction firms that specialize in new constructions or renovations of existing stock.68
Construction costs can be increased by a variety of factors, such as land price increases due to
land shortages and increases in short-term credit costs. On the other hand, construction costs can
also decrease due to a drop in input prices, the provision of direct grants to housing developers,
relaxed zoning policy, and mortgage interest reduction.69 Graph 6 shows the long-run and shortrun supply curves for the entire construction industry.70 At equilibrium, the supply of housing
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and the number of new starts depends on the physical depreciation of housing stock. However
real estate markets are frequently in disequilibrium. In this case, housing construction starts is
equal to gross new investment, which may be greater or less than the equilibrium value if there is
an undersupply or oversupply in housing, respectively. Note that the physical rate of depreciation
can be influenced by political context. Low-quality construction materials, improper
maintenance, overutilization of refurbishment (i.e. too little new construction), and government
subsidization of demolition can increase the physical rate of depreciation of housing stock each
year.71
Of course, any generalized real estate model serves only as an approximation of actual
real estate markets, and this model in particular relies on three fundamental long-term
assumptions: unitary income elasticity of demand, unitary price elasticity of demand, and infinite
supply elasticity. In more general terms, these three assumptions respectively mean that the
demand for space increases proportionately with economic activity, that the demand for space
decreases proportionally with increases in price, and that housing construction costs remain
constant. One important insight we can distill from these assumptions is that the housing stock is
inversely proportional to rent, if we assume that in the long-run rent should be a fixed percentage
of income for the whole population.72
The strength in the Wachter-Kroll model (and by extension, the DiPasquale-Wheaton)
model is its ability to generalize the complex housing market. However, a number of
simplifications are required to make this general equilibrium model. For example, aspects like
bargaining, leverage effects, monopoly power of the government in land supply, the political
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economy of housing supply or strategic interactions between real estate developers are
omitted.”73 Moreover, this model does not predict what happens when individual economic
agents make mistakes or act off of imperfect information, the so-called trembling hand problem.
Overbuilding by construction developers can still happen, which can result in an oversupply of
housing stock in the housing market.
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SECTION 3: HOUSING PRIVATIZATION

A PRIMER ON HOUSING PRIVATIZATION
What is housing privatization, and what does it aim to accomplish? In the most general
sense, privatization is about replacing the public sector with the private sector.74 Somewhat more
specifically, housing privatization is a series of policies that move from a government-owned and
-managed housing system to a market-run housing system. However, this definition is too vague
to systematically classify the various programs and initiatives that could hold the moniker of
housing privatization. Privatization policies vary widely in their goals, outcomes, and definitions;
therefore, it is important to develop a common language around the terms.75
The goal of privatization with respect to housing may vary widely from country to
country. These objectives could include: reducing public expenditure, divesting central or local
government of financial or administrative problems, using a market-based system to maximize
efficiency, or using a market-oriented housing system to legitimize market systems. Today,
academics recognize that moving to a market-based housing system results in a decline in
government spending, no rationing, an increase in supply, a decrease in rent and housing costs,
and an increase in quality (especially due to improved location). However, a market-based
system requires the ability to borrow—otherwise residents are constrained to renting—and a
mortgage market that can resolve the time inconsistency problem. The time inconsistency
problem relates to the fact that residents have a demand for housing before they have saved the
money necessary to buy a house; a mortgage allows residents to purchase a house today and pay
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for it over time as their earnings increase. The goal of privatization may be just one or a
combination of these objectives.76
Evaluation privatization is also difficult. In the case of privatization, what is considered
as good outcome? Two approaches can be proposed: evaluation based upon the aims of the
privatization and evaluation based on objective criteria.
The definition of privatization varies widely across different countries and time periods.
Furthermore, privatization is more of a spectrum that the term would otherwise suggest. In West
Germany in the early 1990s, “social housing” was owned by private companies but funded and
regulated by the government. In the United States, housing is owned, built, and funded by private
citizens; however, housing is strongly regulated by the government, and there is heavy
government intervention in the housing finance (i.e. mortgage) system.77 The variety of options
for housing and housing finance systems requires that housing privatization be thought about
more comprehensively. Under one conceptualization, housing sectors sit along an axis ranging
from an ideal publicly- or state-run housing system to an ideal privately-run housing system.
Housing privatization—by this definition—involves a significant shift of the housing system
from a public-oriented housing sector towards a market-oriented housing system.

PUBLIC AND PRIVATE HOUSING SYSTEMS
What differentiates a public-oriented housing system from a market-oriented one?
Housing privatization can be thought about along four different criteria: provision, subsidy and
taxation, regulation, and objective.78
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Public provision of housing means four things. Firstly, housing is owned by the
government—either federal or regional—or government institutions. Secondly, the main source
of investment strategy comes from the government, such as through taxes or revenues
borrowing. Thirdly, the housing is implemented and managed by the state bureaucracy. Fourthly,
accountability for a public housing system falls on government officials or elected
representatives; inadequate housing outcomes manifest themselves as complains or even protests
by individual constituents. However, private provision of housing sits on the other end of the
axis. Firstly, housing assets are owned by private individuals (e.g. homeowners or landlords),
collectives of individuals, or private institutions. Secondly, individuals or institutional sources
make up the main source of investment funds. Thirdly, housing is implemented and managed by
autonomous private companies and individuals, typically with the market acting as the facilitator
of the system. Fourthly, accountability is to investors and customers; inadequate housing
outcomes manifest themselves as insufficient profits or complaints by tenants.79
Under public subsidy and taxation, the government typically subsidizes housing through
a subsidy to production (e.g. direct capital subsidies to house building) but does not tax
institutions. Under private subsidy and taxation, the government very rarely subsidizes housing,
but if there is a housing subsidy it is typically done through a subsidy to consumption (e.g.
housing allowances or tax relief). Furthermore, institutions that participate in private housing
sectors are taxed.80
Regulation under a public housing sector happens directly through the state, given that
housing provisions occurs through the state as well. State control and regulation is also used to
control housing output levels. However, under a private housing system, regulation is present but
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through the use of law. Instead of the government determining housing output levels, the market
is used to facilitate and determine that appropriate amount of housing needed.81
The objective of a public housing system is to meet socially or politically defined needs
and demands. Public housing systems, for example, are common in Socialist nations, where
housing is seen as a public service and a fundamental human right as opposed to a consumed
commodity. The objective of a private housing system, in contrast, is private profit for those who
fund the housing system and private consumption for individuals and institutions who want to
consume housing as a commodity.82
Collectively, these four criteria define an ideal public housing sector and an ideal private
housing sector. Through this paper, we define housing privatization in the post-Communist
context as moving from a public housing sector to a private housing sector along two or more
different criteria: provision, subsidy and taxation, regulation, and objective.

HISTORY OF HOUSING PRIVATIZATION
In developed countries, the move from public housing systems to market housing systems
has evolved over just the last few decades. Nonetheless, housing systems have possessed both
private and public elements in the Western world for almost a century. Early in the 20th century,
housing systems were dominated by public ownership and public expenditure. Nonetheless,
private lending for homeownership was supported by the United States government as far back
as the 1930s. Although this phenomenon is not as old as it is in the West, private attributes have
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also been present in Eastern Europe (in nations such as Hungary) for at least a half-century.83
Prior to World War II, government involvement in housing systems was predominantly limited
to traditional housing finance systems. Government-owned banks allocated credit at belowmarket rents to attractive loan applicants. Unfortunately, funds were typically rationed to just a
very small percent of the population and frequently to just civil servants or government
bureaucrats. Following World War II, government involvement increased across a number of
important economic sectors, and housing was no exception. Social housing programs developed
that aimed to increase homeownership through greater government involvement in construction,
provision, subsidy, and/or regulation. One important development was the creation of marginal
enclave public programs. These programs were intended to serve those in marginal communities,
but ultimately incurred large resource costs and served few. Starting in the 1980s, however,
governments began to adopt housing privatization and incorporate more and more private
attributes into largely public housing systems. This policy move spread rapidly across the world.
The US, UK, and Western Europe transitioned in the 1980s; Eastern Europe and Russia
transitioned in the 1990s; and China, India, and parts of Latin America began the transition in the
2000s.84
Why did housing privatization begin to spread so quickly? In retrospect, these policies
(especially in the West) seemed like obvious win-win outcomes, especially for election-minded
politicians. Firstly, housing privatization allowed governments to significantly reduce public
expenditure. In the UK, housing expenditure decreased from 5.6% of total public expenditure in
1980 to 1.2% of total public expenditure by 2000 due to housing privatization efforts that began
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under the Conservative Party. The funds freed from these efforts could then be poured into tax
cuts or into other spending programs such as social security, health, education, and defense.85,86
Secondly, housing privatization resulted in a housing system that was more efficient, better
distributed, and more malleable to housing policy instruments. A market-oriented housing
system was more efficient because of more effective cooperation between agents of demand (i.e.
homeowners and renters) and agents of supply (i.e. construction firms, rental agencies, and
investors) through increased producer competition and increased consumer choice. The system
was more malleable to policy changes as a greater variety of housing policy instruments could be
used; for example, housing subsidies could be targeted more directly to those that needed them
with less bureaucratic headache. Finally, the system was better distributed because chronic
housing shortages were addressed and well-off government bureaucrats no longer benefitted
disproportionately from the provision of good-quality subsidized apartments because of their
government connections and know-how. Thirdly, politicians were able to benefit from
ideological associations with housing privatization. Although housing privatization represented a
decrease in total public expenditure on housing, citizens were sold on the increased consumer
choice and consumer power they benefitted from (including, but not limited to, greater mobility
or ease in moving). Furthermore, citizens were excited to see an end to what was termed a
“culture of dependency” and the rise of an “enterprise culture” that provided many in the
working class with the first experience of property ownership.87 A number of Western politicians
in the 1980s—including such icons as Margaret Thatcher—benefitted handsomely from housing
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privatization and its ancillary effects; one important but unanticipated side effect was an increase
in self-employment as workers benefitted from greater mobility and increased need for
housing.88 The many benefits of housing privatization—coupled with the decreased expenditure
the policy implied—was a no-brainer for most governments, which helps explain why it was
adopted relatively quickly.
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SECTION 4: HOUSING AND HOUSING POLICY IN CUBA

Some of the most dramatic changes in housing outcomes in the Western hemisphere have
occurred in Cuba over the last fifty years. Unfortunately, little information is available on this
radical transformation due to the Castro regime’s totalitarian nature. General secrecy and
widespread lack of transparency have plagued academic efforts at collecting reliable and
consistent data.
What data is available is typically created by and sourced from the regime itself. This is
problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, scholars have struggled to analyze economic
performance of Socialist countries such as the Soviet Union, China, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and
the German Democratic Republic due to the lack of important indicators of information such as
independent (i.e. undistorted) price signals, which serve as a relatively reliable and consistent
way of analyzing how demand and supply interact. Secondly, in these types of countries, it is
difficult to compare data from year to year as data bases differ, definitions change, and product
coverage varies. This is most frequently problematic when comparing pre-Socialist and postSocialist time periods, but it can also be troubling after significant policy changes occur within a
Socialist nation as was the case by late 1960s Cuba. Thirdly, and perhaps more importantly, data
in centrally-planned nations formed under a strong ideological basis is inherently unreliable. Put
another way, the Cuban government clearly wishes to show the superiority of its social and
economic systems, which makes the temptation to distort information overwhelming.89 The
research that comes out of the US suffers from the opposite bias. Much research is completed by
or funded by Cuban refugees, many of whom have an ideological conflict with the Castro regime
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and hope to see its swift demise. This paper tries to take the middle path and present a balanced
view by using sources with both biases, but it is difficult to claim objectivity due to the bias
inherent in the sources used.
Academic research shows that this type of distortion can be seen in economic statistics
from the Soviet Union, as Soviet index numbers contained inflated output levels and frequently
omitted unfavorable values from economic reports. The same situation appears to have occurred
to some degree in Cuba. The Castro regime has avoided revealing poor economic performance
through both the omission of certain indicators for a given year or by presenting data over a
longer (e.g. five-year) timeline; both of these tactics have been used by the Cuban government.
In Cuba, this phenomenon was exacerbated by Cuba’s charismatic leader Fidel, who
demonstrated time and time again that he was not above distorting stories and facts unreasonably
to make a point. At the most deliberate level, distorting information involves faking numbers and
data to paint a favorable economic picture.90
Although specific housing figures and indicators may be unreliable, understanding how
housing policy and housing outcomes have changed in Cuba is valuable for understanding where
housing policy and housing outcomes might be following housing privatization. Because finding
information on housing policy from before, during, and after the revolution is rather difficult,
this paper presents a comprehensive literature review exploring both housing outcomes and
housing policy from before the revolution to the present. In particular, the policy initiatives are
important as they begin to paint a picture of how housing policy was envisioned, shaped, and
implemented in Cuba over the past half-century.
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PRE-REVOLUTIONARY CUBA
The history of Cuba’s housing situation is unique, if only because of Cuba’s unique
position in history. By the end of the 1800s, Cuba was the jewel of the Spanish crown and its
most important remaining colony. In that era, Cuba’s enormous sugar earnings and its role as the
center of Spain’s declining empire meant that Cuba urbanized earlier and accumulated relatively
greater wealth than most other Latin American nations. This wealth was reflected in the building
landscape of Cuba as an expression of Spanish colonial power and was especially obvious in the
public and private buildings of Havana and other urban areas. Curiously, urbanization in Cuba in
1899 exceeded that of the USA by some metrics. 1899, 28.5% of the Cuban population lived in
cities of more than 20,000, a greater proportion than even the United States at that time, which
had only 23.8%.91

CUBA AT THE TIME OF THE REVOLUTION
Before the revolution, Cuba was a neocolony of the United States, with all of the income
inequality this status brings. In 1953, over 80% of rural dwellings were bohíos, thatched-roof
huts with dirt floors. In 1953, less than 10% of rural dwellings had electricity or plumbing. In
1953, 95% of urban dwellings in Havana had electricity. Less than 50% had complete sanitary
facilities. Roughly 50% were considered of acceptable quality. 6% of Havana’s population lived
in squatter settlements. Between 650,000-750,000 housing units were considered substandard out
of a total housing stock of 1,400,000 housing units. Moreover, economic crisis exacerbated the
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difficult housing situation. After World War Ii, there was rampant real estate speculation until
the revolution, creating economic instability in the nation.92
In terms of housing policy, Cuba was rather advanced by the 1950s. One of Cuba’s most
important policies pertained to rent control—essentially a combination of rent freezes or
reductions for most units and some moderate increases, usually for newer properties--starting in
1939 until the revolution and beyond. Cuba’s rent control program was one of the earliest in the
world. Each law that was developed increased the number of new rental construction properties
under regulation; increase came from bringing in more and more previously unregulated
properties under consideration. However, investors found ways to circumvent the law, such as
unregulated subletting, furniture fees, and “key money.” Furthermore, investors started building
condominiums with the help of a 1952 law to avoid the regulation. These condos were sold to
tenants on installment plans (ostensibly since national mortgage were unavailable), and mortgage
rates were usuriously high. Pre-Revolutionary Cuba also established a law that granted a “right
to occupancy” for rental tenants (i.e. condo buyers didn’t apply). This occupancy granted rental
tenants the right to be evicted only with just cause. Out of a total urban rental stock of 460,000
housing units, an average of 70,000 evictions were ordered each year in the mid-1950s. The
country also had relatively strong labor movements, which helped limit marginalization of lowincome rental tenants. Nonetheless, the macroeconomic relationship with the United States had
important implications for social inequality and economic disparity within the nation. Roughly
25% of workers’ incomes were spent on housing in 1950s, which was high compared to other
countries at the time.93
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REVOLUTIONARY CUBA AND HOUSING REFORM
At the start of the revolution, the Urban Reform Law set into motion drastic changes to
Cuban housing policy that affected the nation for decades. Seeking to remove the vicegrip that
landlords held on Cuban properties, the Urban Reform Law generally eliminated multiple
ownership, gave renters a chance to buy their homes at low costs, and put into motion reforms
that would ultimately put the state in charge for constructing, allocating, and maintaining
housing.94 Leading up to the promulgation of the Urban Reform Law, revolutionary Cuba put a
few housing laws into effect as stopgaps of a sort. The most important of these transition housing
laws were a series of “vacant lot laws,” which attempted to eliminate land speculation and
stimulate construction by forcing landowners to either start building within six months or sell
their vacant or sparsely developed land to someone willing to do so. However, the Urban Reform
Law was the first comprehensive set of laws that pertained to housing. Enacted in October 1960,
the Urban Reform Law established the concept of housing as a public service, with the stated
goal of eventually making it available at no cost to residents.95 In these early years, eliminating
the use of housing for profit was the main goal.96 In the vocabulary of a previous section, the
housing policy objective in Cuba moved from a strong focus on efficiency—an important
outcome of market-based housing systems—to an enormous focus on equity and equitability.
One stipulation of the Urban Reform Law prohibited rental housing entirely—including private
renting and subletting.97 Instead, current tenants were extended the first priorit to buy the
residences they lived in under the condition that they repay the remaining principal (i.e. no
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interest) to owners over time.98 Instead of renting, the Urban Reform Law developed the legal
concept of usufruct leasing, in which the government maintained common ownership of the
property but effectively leased the right to tenants, as long as the property was not damaged or
destroyed. For this reason, the policy of usufruct was a logical extension of prerevolutionary
“right to occupancy” policies that prevented eviction without cause.99 Given the fact that the
mortgage market largely developed to circumvent rent control, mortgages were given the same
treatment as rent; all mortgage agreements were cancelled. Non-institutional mortgage lenders
(e.g. individual lenders and private mortgage companies) received no compensation, but
commercial banks received bonds equivalent to the value of their mortgage holdings.
Commercial banks received compensation because their mortgages were often insured and not
offered at the usurious interest rates of noninstitutional lenders. Another major stipulation of the
Urban Reform Law was the nationalization of cuarterías—typical inner-city slum housing with
families living in one or two small rooms and sharing sanitary facilities—with no compensation
to the slumlords.100,101 Furthermore, families living in the cuarterías and other sub-standard
housing stopped paying rent.102 Although the new government had no qualms with hurting
speculators, large landlords, and private mortgage lenders, it did not desire to hurt small
landlords and small mortgage holders, many of whom held income-generate property for
financial security in their old age. For this reason, the Urban Reform Law also stipulated that
former landlords and mortgage holders receive a lifetime pension of up to 250 pesos a month
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(roughly $250 USD per month at the time). Although this was a decently large sum at the time, it
was nothing compared to the 3 to 5 million pesos received annually by some large landlords in
the period. The consequences of the Urban Reform Law were enormous, and the legislation set
the overall legal framework for housing for Cuba over the next two decades. The new Cuban
government gave security of tenure and virtual protection against eviction for both homeowners
and leaseholders, ended private ownership of housing for profit, effectively ended speculation in
buildings and land, and redistributed roughly 80 million pesos to tenants from landlords through
rent reduction laws.103
The radical change to new housing policy meant that new housing institutions also had to
be developed. One of the most important housing institutions is a housing finance system.
Housing finance makes homeownership more feasible, as homeowners can take out a mortgage
instead of being forced to rent until they save up enough money to purchase a house in cash.
Within weeks of the start of the Cuban revolution—January 1959—the National Institute for
Savings and Housing (INAV) was created. INAV used proceeds from the national lottery to
finance housing with no-interest and low-interest (less than or equal to 5%) loans in order to
finance over 8,500 units but it only lasted two years.104 Another significant institutional change
was the development of a massive direct government building program. Previously, the vast
majority of housing was constructed by private construction firms and investors; with the regime
change, the Socialist government would now be responsible for paying for and running national
housing construction.105 At first, this program would be facilitated by readily available materials
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and excess capacity in the construction industry immediately after the revolution, as unemployed
construction workers and others could be quickly absorbed into new projects. However,
resources soon became hard to come by, especially after the start of the 1961 US-sponsored trade
embargo.106 New government regulation also limited and regulated the buying and selling of
houses. Citizens were limited to the ownership of one primary residence and a vacation home. In
the case that citizens wanted to sell a dwelling, they could only sell at government-set prices, and
the state had the first option to buy the property. Inheritance of a dwelling—regardless of
whether the tenure was through homeownership or usufruct leasing—was limited to only those
who had lived with the deceased in the dwelling for a year or more. These strict restrictions
meant that relatively little legal private buying and selling of land occurred for decades, although
“informal” sales were not uncommon. Furthermore, the government-regulated exchange of
houses became popular, where two individuals would swap residences by gaining authorization
from the relevant government agency.107 This exchange method—known as permuta—would
persist for decades and still remains an important way to trade properties today. To summarize, a
number of housing institutions were developed at the start of the revolution. This included a
limited housing finance system, a state-sponsored massive-direct-building housing program,
restrictions on the buying and selling of properties, and a system of exchange known as permuta.

HOUSING AND HOUSING POLICY FROM 1965-1970
Although major housing reforms were put into place in the first years of the revolution,
the government was forced to prioritize other policies it deemed more important in the face of
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limited resources. These resource constraints foreshadowed difficulties that Cuba would face for
decades to come. One priority was assigned to Agrarian reform laws required the provision of
government-built, rent-free, furnished dwellings located in newly-developed rural towns. This
policy of “urbanizing” the countryside reflected Cuba’s strong commitment to overcoming
differences between rural and urban areas, but it also required a disproportionate amount of
resources.108 One of the best examples of this investment—an impressive rural settlement that
required a disproportionate level of resources—is the Las Terrazas rural community that was
inaugurated in 1971. The village was meant for reforestation workers in Sierra de los Organos,
and the community began with 46 one-story detached houses with light-prefabricated walls and
pitched clay-tile roofs so it would blend with the environment. Years after its initial construction,
two-story apartments and a beautiful hotel would be added to the community as well.109
However, overinvestment in rural areas ultimately resulted in the neglect of urban areas,
especially Havana. New housing construction was insufficient to accommodate just the
depreciation of housing stock, let alone the population increase caused by a massive baby boom
and increased rural migration to cities. Furthermore, few resources were devoted to maintenance
and repair of existing stock, a problem that continues to exist in Cuba even until this very day.110
Another major priority involved the immediate destruction of shantytowns. Although this
initiative was successful, it would only exacerbate the perennial housing shortage that plagues
Cuba to this day.111
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Issues with housing reform were obvious even by late 1964, when a national housing
conference was held to chart directions for future policy. Nonetheless, housing production was
still subordinated to other needs of the economy in the late 1960s. Roughly 6,500 units were built
each year over the period, grossly insufficient for the population at the time. In particular, the
government focused on structural and productive investments, allocating just meager resources
to housing. Virtually no construction was completed in larger urban areas, especially Havana.
Because of severe shortages of both materials and labor, a lightweight prefabricated building
system was used extensively for one- and two-story construction. This policy focus—known as
industrialized construction—was strongly pursued, and experimentation also began with
prefabrication systems for more complex building systems.112
To deal with the insufficient housing construction, private citizens constructed “selfbuilt” housing—households obtained their own materials, leveraged social relationships for help
with labor, and hired self-employed building tradespeople as needed. The national government
by and large ignored private, self-built housing, and would continue to do so until the 1970s and
beyond.113
Despite insufficient government construction, the government attempted to provide basic
amenities as well as possible. This meant the provision of latrines and cement floors to 100,000
rural dwellings and the development of electricity and other urban infrastructure in low-income
urban neighborhoods.114
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HOUSING AND HOUSING POLICY FROM 1971-1975
The government failure to achieve major objectives in other sectors marked the change of
the revolution to a new phase, a period that was called “institutionalization.” After more than
half a decade of dismal rates of new housing construction, there was considerable pressure to
increase building, especially in urban areas such as Havana.115 In contrast to the “urbanization”
of the countryside, a type of “ruralization” had occurred in Havana due to the widespread
presence of makeshift self-constructions and additions, such as shacks built on rooftops,
livestock living in backyards, and porches renovated into extra rooms.116 However, despite the
best intentions to improve housing quality in Havana, the situation was complicated by the
difficulty of obtaining construction materials and an acute shortage of labor. Cubans found ways
to improvise—although construction materials remained in short supply, domestic production of
cement and other had improved the situation markedly. However, the labor situation remained
the biggest obstacle and was driven chiefly by a sharp drop in productivity and increased worker
absenteeism in the 1960s. Taking advantage of citizen participation in self-built housing
construction, the government formed microbrigades—teams of roughly 30 employees from a
given workplace—to work with skilled workers from the Ministry of Construction to build
housing for the workplace labor force. The microbrigade system also served as a method for
recruiting former construction workers, fostering greater workplace camaraderie, and ensuring
that new housing was located close to workplaces. Microbrigades proved to quite an effective
tool—over half of the roughly 19,000 units built annually from 1972-1975 were constructed by
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microbrigades. Put another way, the microbrigade system appeared to double117 or even triple118
annual government housing construction in the early 1970s.
In the early 1970s, housing legislation extended exemptions from making housing
payments to very-low-income families. This meant that by this period rent-free leases had been
provided to residents of rural new towns, cuartería residents, and now very-low-income
families.119
Implications of earlier housing policies began to be felt in this period. For example,
housing shortages forced citizens to live together and government policies ensuring the absolute
security of tenure limited the ability to evict tenants, which led to an increasing number of
situations where visitors effectively moved in by overstaying their welcome and where divorced
couples were forced to live together. In response, the government passed legislation to
differentiate between the principal legal resident, legal occupants, and guest occupants in
households. Furthermore, housing in many cases was assigned to citizens based on their
workplaces. When employment ceased for these workers through retirement or work transfers,
they could sometimes be left homeless. This situation was exacerbated by the fact that local
officials were reluctant to evict these tenants to keep skilled laborers in their areas and to
maintain a stable work force. Finally, insufficient housing construction and maintenance resulted
in severe housing deterioration, which led to families living long-term in shelters intended only
for temporary relocation.120

117

Jill Hamberg. Under Construction: Housing Policy in Revolutionary Cuba (New York: Center for Cuban Studies,
1986), 10-12.
118
Teddy Kapur and Alastair Smith. Housing Policy in Castro’s Cuba. (Boston: Joint Center for Housing Studies,
2002), 6.
119
Jill Hamberg. Under Construction: Housing Policy in Revolutionary Cuba (New York: Center for Cuban Studies,
1986), 12-13.
120
Jill Hamberg. Under Construction: Housing Policy in Revolutionary Cuba (New York: Center for Cuban Studies,
1986), 12-13.

55

HOUSING AND HOUSING POLICY FROM 1976-1980
Macroeconomic instability exacerbated the housing crisis in the late 1970s. Increasing
energy costs, a worldwide recession coupled with inflation in capitalist nations, and a sharp
decline in the global commodity sugar price simultaneously reduced Cuban sugar revenues and
increased import costs. Planners optimistically expected to produce roughly 100,000 housing
units annually by 1980, but instead just under 50,000 units were completed each year, a drastic
shortage. Just 16,400 of these units were built by the government; the rest were privately built.
Housing policy continued to focus on industrialized, prefabricated housing as the main way to
deal with the housing shortage. However, policymakers also adopted a number of new initiatives
to ameliorate the housing problem: local assistance through the distribution of housing materials
to self-built housing, a fivefold increase to the budget for maintenance and repair of housing, and
an end to increases in microbrigades (creating more support for state brigades of skilled
worker).121

HOUSING AND HOUSING POLICY FROM 1981-1985
The early 1980s marked a renewed focus on housing. The 1981 census showed that
roughly 50% of Cuban housing stock had been built post-Revolution, and there was also a
significant increase to housing amenities due to the availability of electricity, water, sanitary
facilities, and basic domestic appliances. Nonetheless, the Cuban government was still unable to
address the perennial housing shortage. Housing starts averaged just over 45,000 units annually
in the 1970s; this level equaled the 45,000 units needed annually to replace old units and provide
for population growth. Furthermore, this total did not include the new housing stock needed to
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renovate the hundreds of thousands of dilapidated structures or the new housing stock needed to
thwart the emerging phenomena of doubling up or overcrowding. By the 1980s, housing
deterioration was starting to have adverse effects, as vacate orders and building collapses became
increasingly common. The 1980s also marked significant social changes in Cuba. The baby
boom generation of the 1960s reached adulthood at the same time that divorce rates skyrocketed
in Cuba; both of these phenomena increased the demand for housing. Because government-built
housing was primarily distributed through workplaces, many young Cuban households turned to
self-built housing, resulting in the rapid expansion of self-built construction.122 The early 1980s
also marked a resurgence in the extralegal and illegal housing markets. Byzantine government
policies on subletting and housing transfers—coupled with excess spending power—resulted in
an increase in under-the-table payments in otherwise legal exchanges of housing and land.
Despite growing concerns with the Cuban housing market, housing construction continued to
improve.123 In the early 1980s, roughly 82,800 new units were constructed each year. Roughly
30,000 of these new units were government-built, and the remainder were self-built
construction.124
In December 1984, sweeping housing reforms were enacted through the Ley General de
la Vivienda. The new law was composed of eight major policies, but generally converted
leaseholders in government-owned housing into homeowners, permitted limited short-term
private rentals, and fostered self-built housing construction. Firstly, the law converted 460,000
Cuban rent-paying households (roughly 20% of homeowners) into homeowners through low-rent
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amortizations and 740,000 self-built households into homeowners without any fee. Secondly, the
law changed how state-built housing was allocated; housing was to be allocated through local
public agencies instead of workplaces. Thirdly, the law permitted free-market sales of land,
housing, and roof development rights, although the state still maintains the right to purchase the
property, and the law resolved inheritance issues. Fourthly, the law provided for active public
involvement in self-built construction and offered low-interest loans to cover building costs.
Fifthly, the law permitted owners to rent rooms for under six months. Sixthly, the law put the
onus for major renovations to housing stock onto the government as opposed to individual
homeowners. Seventhly, the law created formal regulations to deal with non-payment by tenants
and illegal occupants. Finally, the law maintained a limited number of housing units linked to
workplaces.125

HOUSING AND HOUSING POLICY FROM 1986-1990
The extensive housing reforms stemming from the 1984 Housing Law were limited due
to the financial hardships experienced by the Cuban government with the gradual decline of the
Russian economy. Insufficient hard currency prevented sufficient housing construction and
repair, and microbrigades continued to weaken during the late 1980s. Due to the lack of
resources, the government attempted to address various housing objectives such as economic
development, equity, and improving conditions for members of the worst strata, and using
collective allocation to fight corruption.126 Finding reliable data for this period is difficult
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because the housing censuses completed in both the 1980s and 1990s contained little specialized
information.127

HOUSING AND HOUSING POLICY FROM 1990-2000 (THE SPECIAL PERIOD)
Following the demise of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc, Cuba’s economy faced a
tremendous shock. Cuba suddenly faced the loss of its major trading partners (which constituted
85% of total trade), a 50%+ decline in oil imports, a steep decrease in supply of Russian parts for
its increasingly Russian machinery, curtailed access to privileged prices, and the termination of
almost all of its lines of credit. This dramatic economic hardship resulted in the Castro regime
declaring the beginning of the Special Period, essentially a wartime state in a time of peace. In
order to maintain the most important social programs such as universal education, however,
Cuba desperately needed to increase its hard currency reserves and foreign-facing economic
activity.128 Due to low export levels and dramatic financial hardship, the Cuban government
opened up to tourism beginning in 1993. This change required sweeping changes to housing
laws. Starting in 1994, Cuba opened real estate up to foreign investment as part of a strategy to
combat low economic activity. Foreign firms could enter into joint ventures with the Cuban
government, and non-resident foreigners could purchase homes for the first time. In addition,
Cuban citizens were allowed to rent up to two rooms in their home to other Cubans or tourists
through a rental scheme known as casas particulares. In May 2000, regulations changed:
housing purchases by non-resident foreigners were prohibited, and only the rental of units was
allowed.
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Although components of the housing sector opened up to market activity at the start of
the Special Period, the vast majority of the housing system remained publicly-run, especially the
housing provision and housing construction components. This characteristic—coupled with
material scarcity and oil shortages—meant that most social housing products were immediately
stopped, including both traditional large-scale prefabricated housing construction projects and
even more simple Microbrigades. Given Cuba’s already critical housing shortage, this policy
decision exacerbated an already incredibly problematic situation. As a stopgap measure, the
Cuban government developed a new variety of social housing construction known as the Social
Microbrigade, which used local materials, local labor, and soft technologies to build homes out
of soil-cement blocks, micro-mortar tiles, light concrete beams, and more.129
The curtailing of social housing construction and scarcity of building materials made selfbuilt housing—the cornerstone of the Cuban housing sector for decades by this point—
simultaneously more important and harder to pursue. To deal with their unsatisfied needs, many
Cubans turned to illegal or extralegal solutions to their problems, such as building new detached
homes, attaching new home additions, or splitting existing residences. To deal with material
shortages, Cubans recycled old materials of very poor quality or bought building materials on the
black market.130
The late part of the Special Period also saw the rise of Cuban non-governmental
organizations (NGOs). One important one was Habitat-Cuba, which petitioned international
NGOs and non-profits for financial and material aid to build housing in Cuba. Habitat-Cuba
couples these outside resources with use of local materials and adequate technologies to create
unique solutions to the housing shortage problem. For example, wood is in scarce supply in
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Cuba, but it is an essential material for window and door construction. One initiative explored
bamboo as an alternative to wood through the development of appropriate technology and by
planting bamboo groves for harvesting. The increased role of NGOs intersected with growing
environmental consciousness, and Cubans became more and more focused on promoting
environmental awareness and on discovering environmentally sustainable approaches to
economic problems such as housing shortages.131,132
Finding reliable data for this period is difficult because the housing censuses completed
in the 1980s and the 1990s contained little specialized information.133 According to housing
census data from the early 2000s, 141,000 new housing units were constructed and 250,000
housing units were renovated and conserved from 1996-2000.134

HOUSING AND HOUSING POLICY TODAY (THE LATE SOCIALIST PERIOD)
Although the Cuban economy improved in the early 2000s, housing construction levels
plummeted. Housing construction levels dropped from roughly 40,000 units annually in the late
1990s to just 15,000 units annually in 2003 and 2004.135 From 2001 to 2005, 134,000 housing
units were constructed nationwide. Due to important housing initiatives, over twice that (278,000
housing units) was produced from 2005-2010. Despite this impressive increase, the national
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housing deficit remains incredibly high: the national housing shortage is over 1,000,000 units136
in a country with 3,700,000 total housing units.137
Housing stock levels also dropped significantly due to weather damage caused by
hurricanes, tropical storms, and flooding. From 2001 to 2008, 139,000 units were destroyed and
965,000 units were damaged across the nation. All of these damaged units required extensive
repairs and rebuilding. Although Havana did not face the brunt of this weather damage, it did
suffer from drop in availability of construction materials; many of these resources were
dedicated to repairing schools, hospitals, and clinics.138,139
In response to critical housing shortages, the government launched a major initiative in
September 2005. Unfortunately, the initial goals of this project were overly ambitious; although
these goals were not achieved, 110,000 new units were completed in just 16 months. The goals
of the initiative have gradually been reduced every year; by 2008, the annual requirement was for
50,000 units. The initiative did spur new housing construction, but it also suffered from
fraudulent reporting from local municipalities that reported phantom units as completed.140,141
Important housing reforms passed in the early 2010s. In November 2011, Decree-Law
288 passed, which allows Cubans to buy and sell their homes without authorization from the
government and with the sale price determined by both parties and not the government, marking
the beginning of the first residential real estate market in Cuba in over a half-century. Cubans are
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even allowed to sell their homes and keep the proceeds before leaving the country, although
restrictions on the number of properties that can be owned and which properties can be
mortgaged persist. This policy change marks a radical departure from the previous permuta or
exchange model, and represents the first time the Cuban government has legitimized a market
system during the reign of the Castro brothers.142

CONCLUSION
The need for a summary of housing policy and outcomes in Cuba stems from the dearth
of housing information available today. This lack of information is caused by the Cuba’s status
as a secretive Socialist state and the US embargo. The little data on Cuban housing that is
available is likely biased; Cuban housing data is tainted with pro-regime bias, and American
research coming out of Miami or funded by Cuban refugees living in the US is likely tainted
with anti-regime bias. This paper attempts to present a balanced perspective by using both sets of
sources.
In the last century, Cuban housing policy moved significantly away from and then
gradually creeped back towards a market-oriented housing system. Prior to the revolution, the
Cuban housing market was a market-oriented housing system with some public intervention.
Power in the housing system seems to have been in the hands of landlords and investors,
although this perspective may be somewhat anachronistic. Cuba passed some of the earliest rent
control and “right to occupancy” laws in the world. This policy stance suggests that although
capitalists definitely possessed more power than tenants, Cubans tenants may have possessed
relatively more power than tenants in other nations. Unfortunately, Cuba’s status as an American
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neocolony marginalized the average Cuban. A large percentage of national property was in
American hands, and there is some evidence of rent usury: a larger percentage of worker income
was spent on housing in Cuba than in other nations. In terms of urban development, accounts are
mixed; there is some evidence that Cuba possessed the most advanced buildings and
infrastructure in Latin America, but other evidence refutes this stance. A major issue at the time
was rampant disparity between urban locations and rural locations. Rural farmers lived in dismal
conditions; although there were issues with the urban housing situation, it was significantly
better than the countryside.
The rise of the Communist regime resulted in a significant transition to a public-oriented
housing system. The Urban Reform Law marked a monumental ideological achievement, but in
the first few years of the revolution actual housing outcomes suffered due to poor
implementation. Housing shortages that started in the 1960s only compounded over the 50 years
that followed. At least from a theoretical perspective, rent control policies started in the 1950s
and amplified greatly post-revolution have resulted in misallocated housing, insufficient housing
quality, and insufficient housing stock.143 The state-owned housing construction sector, coupled
with a complete dearth of housing finance options, has greatly restricted housing options and
only exacerbated housing issues. Although significant gains were achieved for Cubans living in
the rural countryside, insufficient housing investment has persisted for decades in Havana and
other important cities. Slower-than-anticipated economic growth and the inherent inefficiency of
a centrally-planned, public housing system has only exacerbated early housing shortages,
resulting in a constantly growing housing deficit. At the present, the housing shortage is at least
1,000,000 housing units in a country with just 3,700,000 total housing units; this number may
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still be too low due to overcrowding caused by suppressed formation of new households, as
occurred in the former Soviet Union in the 1990s.
Attempts by the Cuban government to solve this housing shortage—through
prefabricated housing construction, Microbrigades, and Social Microbrigades—had some
success but did not address the problem. By far, the most important contribution to address the
chronic housing shortage has been the rise of self-built housing by Cuban citizens. Self-built
housing construction essentially began with Cubans who decided to take matters into their own
hands. Self-built housing acts as a sort of “necessary evil:” it is not an ideologically legitimized
form of housing provision in a Socialist country but it solves an important social ill.
In the last 15 years, Cuban housing policy under the Castro regime has moved
significantly towards a market-oriented housing system. At the start of the revolution, Cuba’s
housing policy objectives were ideologically driven: housing is a basic social need, not a
commodity; housing should be distributed equitably; and the government should be the primary
housing decision maker.144 Ostensibly, Cuba’s policy objectives have remained the same, but
recent policy initiatives by definition contradict these policy aims. The permission of foreign
investors to build profit-seeking properties for tourism as well as the creation of a residential real
estate proto-market by definition implies that housing is a commodity and not a social good.
Furthermore, market-determined real estate prices and the lifted restriction on housing sales
contradict equitable distribution of housing and instead contribute to income inequality—a
system of haves and have-nots.
It is curious to think about what policies the new Cuban government did not implement at
the start of the revolution or has not implemented yet during the revolution. Firstly, there was
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little redistribution of housing. Small families living in large mansions remained in place, as did
small families living in one-room slums. The only exceptions were unoccupied units
speculatively held off the market or vacated by families who emigrated, which were used by
public agencies or distributed to the families that were most in need. In this stage, greater
equality was achieved by improving conditions for those in the worst housing, not by lowering
anyone’s living standard; there was no forced redistribution of occupied housing. Secondly,
urban land was not nationalized. Although the maximum price for land was set at a low uniform
rate (4 pesos per square meter, roughly $4 USD per square meter at the time), the fact that there
was still a price range allowed for differences in land rent, which derived from variations in
topography, location, and improvements. This policy would have an important impact on density
in later years.
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SECTION 5: ANALYSIS OF EAST BERLIN

POLITICAL CONTEXT
In some ways, post-Communist privatization of East Germany appeared similar to other
post-Communist privatizations. The German Democratic Republic (i.e. GDR, East Germany)
faced challenges included a low standard of living, an undersupply of housing, low-quality
housing stock, little construction, and a weak economy. However, the East German case was
especially complicated because of its unique status as a simultaneous reunification and
privatization. The German Democratic Republic was subsumed under the control of the Federal
Republic of Germany (i.e. FRG, West Germany); due to the latter’s political institutions, East
German institutions needed to move to market-based systems. This complexity added challenges,
such as large-scale emigration of East German citizens to West Germany and income inequality
between the FRG and the GDR.
Following WWII, the FRG government was run by a right-wing coalition comprised
predominantly of Christian Democrats after the nation’s first general election in August 1949.145
The first chancellor was Konrad Adenauer, a representative from the Christian Democratic
Union. The early administration achieved a number of quick victories such as the speedy
development of a social market economy with rather well-functioning market mechanisms. The
FRG soon enjoyed what political commenters called a Wirtschaftswunder, or economic miracle.
Although the FRG struggled to settle ethnically German refugees from East Germany, Poland,
and Czechoslovakia, the nation saw a steady rise in living standards, the abolishment of
rationing, and a rapid recovery of industrial output. As the nation moved into the 1950s, West
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Germany developed stronger and stronger relations with the Western democracies, culminating
in becoming a full member of NATO in 1955. The Christian Democrats maintained widespread
support into the 1960s, although Adenauer was pushed to step down after a scandal involving his
Defense Minister. In 1969, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) gained popular support, resulting
in West Germany’s first full-scale government change through the capture of both the presidency
and the chancellorship in a coalition with the Free Democrats. The SPD coalition enacted both
domestic reforms but was chiefly known for its policy of Ostpolitik, which eased tensions
between West Germany and the Eastern Bloc. Among other actions, the FRG government
recognized the existence of the East German government, increased trade, and otherwise began
to normalize relations. These policies were met by resistance from the Christian Democrats. In
October 1982, the SDP coalition came to an end after just under 15 years. Re-election of the
Christian Democrats saw a strong market focus and improved relationships with the West; this
environment persisted until the rapid deterioration of East Germany beginning around 1989.146
East Germany had a rather distinct political situation. Unlike in other nations, the
Socialist revolution in East Germany was not homegrown and was instead imposed by the Soviet
Union. An election was held in the Soviet occupation zone for a People’s Congress in May 1949;
however, the election was structured in a way that favored the empowerment of the Sovietbacked Socialist Unity party (SED). By October 1949, the People’s Congress ratified a
constitution for the German Democratic Republic. Although the GDR was constitutionally a
parliamentary democracy, decisive power fell to the SED. In the first two decades following the
GDR’s formation, the SED regime focused on building a viable planned economy through the
construction of basic industries; this goal was difficult due to a dearth of natural resources,
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limited geographic area, and a low population. Challenges continued to arise, including low food
production caused by widespread emigration of thousands of East German farmers. Mass
emigrations began to taper off in 1952, when the GDR sealed its borders with the FRG outside of
Berlin. Mounting dissatisfaction with the SED regime led to popular uprisings in the 1950s due
to high production quotas, ideological controls on artistic and intellectual activities, and low
consumer good production. East German emigration to West Germany increased dramatically in
the early 1960s. In response, the East German government sealed off East Berlin in August 1961,
first with barbed wire and later through what would become known as the Berlin Wall. This
policy marked an end to widespread emigration of East Germans and thus helped stabilize the
GDR economy, which eventually became the most highest-performing economy in the Eastern
Bloc. Civil and political freedoms were further restricted in the late 1960s. The 1970s was a
much better decade economically for East Germany, due in particular to the West German policy
of Ostpolitik. The international recognition of the GDR resulted in increased trade with Western
Europe, which bolstered East Germany’s limited hard currency reserves. The economic policy of
focused on industrial production resulted in insufficient consumer goods production, neglect of
necessary maintenance and infrastructure, and chronic housing shortages. Furthermore, East
Germans experienced greater contact with West Germans, which became a major source of
political dissatisfaction; East Germans disapproved of the lack of economic progress their nation
faced compared to the technologically advanced FRG. In the 1970s, political and civil freedoms
continued to be limited, and the SED stressed the Socialist quality of the German state and its
irrevocable ties to the USSR. This reaffirmation of Soviet ties would become problematic in the
late 1980s when the Soviet Union embraced glasnost and perestroika. The 1980s was also
problematic due to the rapid deterioration of the GDR’s economic situation, despite significant
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attempts by the SED regime to maintain the façade of stability. Eventually, the confluence of
political dissent, the demise of the Eastern Bloc, and a poor economic situation resulted in the
fall of the GDR.147 Even after political reunification, unrest remained in East German cities,
including some violent demonstrations by neo-fascists.
By the time of political reunification, the situation in East Germany was stark
economically, quite unlike West Germany and its Wirtschaftswunder. Excluding the brief tenure
of the SDP coalition in the 1970s, the West German government always supported a strong
private sector. In contrast, East Germans at the time of reunification had lived for years in
relative austerity compared to West Germans, and most of East German industry—despite being
quite strong compared to Socialist economies148—lagged greatly behind the rest of Western
Europe.149 GDP per capita was especially low, especially compared to the FRG. Per capita
income in the FRG was $19,200 in 1989, compared to $14,600 in the UK and $20,600 in the
US.150 The poor economic situation meant that an easy solution for East Germans at the time of
reunification was simply moving to West Germany, which was financially quite well-to-do.
Limiting East German emigration to West Germany would be a major headache for German
policymakers for a number of years following reunification.

HOUSING UP UNTIL PRIVATIZATION IN EAST BERLIN
Housing indicators and housing policies leading up to the time of reunification were
radically different. In the FRG, the dominant philosophy shared by both Christian Democrats and
147

Encyclopædia Britannica Online, s. v. "Germany," accessed May 12, 2014,
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/231186/Germany.
148
David Clapham, ed. Housing Privatization in Eastern Europe. (London: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1996),
43.
149
David Clapham, ed. Housing Privatization in Eastern Europe. (London: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1996),
41-42.
150
David Clapham, ed. Housing Privatization in Eastern Europe. (London: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1996),
41.

70

the opposition Social Democrat coalition was a Soziale Marktwirtschaft—a socially-responsible
market economy. In practice, this meant relying on the private sector for housing, both in terms
of owner-occupation and private renting. Nonetheless, there were some safeguards, including
social housing and housing allowances known as Wohngeld.151 In the GDR, housing was
considered a social good and provided by the state. The state acted as both the main housing
developer, managed private and public housing, and controlled private activity in the housing
sector.152 Although the governments took very different approaches to managing housing (a
market-based system as opposed to a state-run system) and classified housing distinctly (a
market good as opposed to a social good), each government’s housing system dealt with both
private and public elements of housing.
The West German housing system became more market-oriented in the 1980s along with
the rest of Western Europe. The construction and allocation of new social housing declined due
to declining political support and the political benefits of privatization. Furthermore, construction
loan conditions were relaxed as more and more loans were repaid, and much social housing was
converted to market-rented housing. Although this resulted in an increase to housing costs, the
government reacted by increasing housing allowances through the Wohngeld bill. By the end of
the 1980s, further measures were undertaken to move the system more towards the free market:
for example, the tax advantages of nonprofit housing organizations were abolished. By the end of
the 1980s, owner-occupied housing was 42% of the housing sector, private rented housing was
42% of the housing sector, and social housing for rent constituted the remaining 16%.153
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Although housing in the GDR resembled the housing sector in other Socialist nations,
there were some peculiarities, such as private ownership and relatively large levels of public
housing construction leading up to 1990. Because East Germany’s revolution was not
homegrown, a robust housing sector developed preceding Socialism. Housing did not fall under
the sole mandate of the state until WWII, when the Soviet Military Administration in the Soviet
Occupation Zone began to implement significant reforms which were later adopted by the
government of the GDR. In addition to bringing housing under state mandate, the Soviet Military
Government also expanded strict rent controls—a policy that originally began with the Nazis in
1936—through Order No. 9 in July 1945. Although a large degree of GDR housing stock was
destroyed by the war, the Soviet Military Government (and later the GDR government) also
limited housing construction of tenement or apartment housing and only tacitly approved the
private ownership of pre-war tenement buildings.154 Unlike many other East European countries,
very little existing housing was converted to public housing. Instead, privately owned residences
remained in private hands, whereas occupants were encouraged to purchase homes in which they
were tenants. Privately owned rented housing was managed by the state, and most owners had
little interest in their properties. To combat any potential inequality from private housing, strict
rent controls were extended. Although rent control had been an established policy for decades,
research suggests that rent regulation results in an insufficient supply of housing,155 as it reduces
investors return on building real estate and thus reduces the number of housing starts for each
period. Furthermore, the short-run demand on rent-controlled markets regularly exceeds the
long-run demand when rent control is abolished, suggesting that rent control causes demand to
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be “pent-up.”156 Secondly, housing construction remained quite high in the GDR leading up to
the country’s demise. In the 1970s and 1980s, there was a renewed boom in state housing
construction, due in particular to Erich Honecker, the General Secretary of the SED.
Unfortunately, housing construction was still insufficient to meet demand, especially due to low
housing quality.
Despite the presence of private housing and other peculiarities, the GDR housing sector
generally resembled that of other Socialist nations, especially due to dismal housing outcomes.
Housing stock in East Germany, as in other Socialist nations, was insufficient in terms of
amount, quality, and amenities. Housing policy in the GDR had distorted market activity,
resulting in conditions in 1990 that were abysmal. Even though the housing policy of the former
GDR maintained reflationary policy (e.g. low interest rates), the housing system was largely
marked by shortages in supply and poor quality of dwellings. An explanation for this result can
be partially explained by the fact that the costs for new construction were cheaper than
maintenance costs and because households typically preferred new flats since they were rentcontrolled under the old regime. As a result, the maintenance of historical domestic buildings
was widely neglected, and the GDR implemented massive programs for construction. A 1989
survey revealed that 780,000 households requested new flats to live in due to low quality of
existing housing supply. However, the bare number of housing units appeared to be more than
sufficient, as almost 400,000 flats—roughly 5% of the housing stock--were vacant.157 By the
1980s, nearly half of the GDR housing stock was in a very bad condition, due to insufficient
maintenance and reinvestment starting in the 1930s. Quality was low due to the widespread use

156

Claus Michelsen and Dominik Weiß. “What Happened to the East German Housing Market? A Historical
Perspective on the Role of Public Funding.” Post-Communist Economies 22 (2010), 397.
157
Claus Michelsen and Dominik Weiß. “What Happened to the East German Housing Market? A Historical
Perspective on the Role of Public Funding.” Post-Communist Economies 22 (2010), 395.

73

of prefabricated panel construction; nearly 90% of public housing construction used prefab
construction methods by the 1990s. Housing amenities were generally lackluster but looked
better in the nation’s capital—95% of East Berlin residences had an indoor toilet compared to
just 61% of Dresden residences in 1990. In general, East Berlin benefitted from the lion’s share
of focus in terms of housing outcomes; housing outcomes were much poorer everywhere else.
The private construction sector in East Germany, also similar to other Socialist nations, was
nearly nonexistent.158 New private building for rent was discouraged, and old privately rented
buildings could be bought and sold but were virtually worthless due to low rent levels caused by
the 1930s-era rent controls. Between the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961 and 1973,
private construction decline sharply due to the focus on state building for rent. Following 1973,
10% of housing production was completed privately by owners but was heavily controlled and
regulated. Throughout the entire period, there appears to have been little unauthorized selfbuilding.159
In summary, the GDR suffered from an undersupply of housing, low-quality housing
stock, and insufficient housing starts to meet housing demand leading up to reunification. More
specifically, the housing sector in the GDR suffered from four major issues. Firstly, most of the
GDR housing stock was from the 1930s; these homes were of low quality, insufficiently
maintained, and lacked amenities. 700,000 of the 7,000,000 total dwellings in the GDR were fit
only for demolition. Secondly, despite efforts by Honecker and a falling population, housing
supply was insufficient to meet housing demand. Thirdly, rents were too low due to rent controls
that regulated rent levels at 1930s levels; rents were insufficient to even cover management and
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maintenance costs. Fourthly, the centrally-planned housing sector resulted in a total absence of
market signals for production and consumption, leading to an inefficient and ineffective use of
resources.160

GOVERNMENT HOUSING POLICIES IN EAST BERLIN
The fall of the Berlin Wall in late 1989 marked the beginning of reunification between
Germany and the German Democratic Republic (GDR). However, the joining of the two German
states exposed politicians to enormous challenges when combining the two economic systems. In
the GDR, these challenges included large-scale emigration, low standard of living, an
undersupply of housing, low-quality housing stock, little construction, and a weak economy. To
address these issues—and especially the low standard of living concern—politicians promised a
fast convergence of standard living across the two states. Industry privatization, however, was at
the top of the political agenda, and a Federal agency known as the Treuhandstalt was given the
mandate of privatizing the former state-owned enterprises by turning over them to new owners
or—in many cases—closing them down.161 Housing policy following reunification took a
somewhat similar route. Unsurprisingly, the Christian Democrat coalition sought to create a
“social market” housing system out of the state-dominated GDR through extensive privatization.
Policymakers believed that state control should be decentralized and replaced with private
decision-makers guided by profitability.162 For this reason, continuing the preexisting GDR
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housing sector would have been untenable, although maintaining a public housing sector would
have been technically possible with sufficient funding.
To achieve this goal, politicians radically revised the housing policy of the GDR. The aim
of privatizing housing stock was first laid down in the Unification Treaty, although housing
enterprises were not treated as state-owned enterprises in terms of implementation shortly
following reunification. Instead, state-owned housing assets were passed into the ownership of
the local authorities, who were given the mandate to gradually privatize the housing stock by
first setting up housing enterprises under private law and eventually selling these enterprises to
private investors.163
Housing policy shifted from a planned housing system to a market-based housing system,
and government officials introduced numerous subsidies designed to stimulate construction of
new homes and refurbish existing housing stock, tax incentives, direct investment grants and
credits to real estate developers, direct aid for construction costs, low-interest loans, urban
renewal policy and demolition programs.164 Starting in January 1991, government officials also
instituted rent reform, which gradually ramped up rent from 1936 levels based on earned income
of East Germans; because these incomes lagged behind West German income levels, East
German rents continued to lag behind the rest of the country for years. However, the housing
allowances implemented under the Wohngeld were also extended to East Germany, which helped
to alleviate some of this new burden.165 In total, federal subsidies to the East German housing
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market (including tax subsidies, direct grants and credits, demolition incentives, and urban
renewal subsidies) totaled EUR 34.789 billion from 1990 to 2008.166
Following reunification, German politicians were concerned about rapid emigration of
East Germans to West Germany, massive numbers of restitution claims,167 and the disastrous
economic situation in the former GDR, which was not competitive on world markets. In the
conceptualization of the Wachter-Kroll six-graph model, these changes would pull in the demand
curve in Graph 1 through both a decrease in population and a low consumer disposable income.
Furthermore, the change in economic system would make consumer’s effective disposable
income even lower, as the state would provide fewer social services, increasing costs for
individual citizens. Over the long run, this would result in insufficient housing construction and
thus inadequate housing supply for East Germans. In order to avoid these problems and to
stimulate economic activity and housing investment, politicians implemented ad hoc urban
renewal programs to strengthen demand for housing in East Germany by improving public
spaces and developing local public infrastructure, offered high tax deductions to attract private
debt capital for new construction and refurbishment, and developed social housing programs to
subsidize construction of new dwellings. Conceptually, the Wachter-Kroll six-graph model
provides a framework for understanding the impact of these policies. Firstly, the urban renewal
programs in the long-run would push out the demand curve in Graph 1 by increasing demand for
real estate in East Germany and competing demand away from West Germany. However, rent is
fixed over the short run and the impact of these programs was gradual, so in the short-run rent
increased by very little, though over the long run they would increase housing supply. Secondly,
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the high tax deductions offered to lenders for financing construction and refurbishment pushed
out the demand curve in Graph 4 by increasing returns on real estate for a given level of rent,
therefore reducing the cap rate. In the short-run, this would manifest itself as an increase in asset
prices, as investors are willing to pay more for a given level of rent, but over the long run this
would manifest itself as an increase in housing supply. Thirdly, the programs for social housing
reduced average costs of construction, pulling down the curve in Graph 5. This had little impact
in the short-term, since construction takes time to complete. However, this policy had the longterm implication of reducing housing prices since over the long term the per-unit asset price must
equal the per-unit asset construction cost.168 Given that there is no change to the cap rate, rent in
the long term should also decrease proportionally. As explained previously, housing stock is
inversely proportional to rent over the long run for a given income level. This assumption
implies that housing stock will increase as rent decreases over the long run. In summary,
decreasing the average cost of construction through subsidies should have had the long-run
implication of increasing housing supply, decreasing rent prices, and decreasing asset prices.
Furthermore, subsidizing construction costs adds a protective measure against negative demand
shocks. In the case that demand drops significantly (perhaps through a drop in population or
consumer income), low construction costs allow for new housing starts and thus long-run
increases to housing supply at lower housing prices.
It is important to note that one consequence was poorly anticipated. The transition to a
new economic system caused excess supply in the short run. Although excess supply is a
standard market reaction following an external shock in a typical real estate cycle, the magnitude
and duration of the shock depends on the intensity of the shock and market conditions, especially
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the elasticity of supply. Here, one interpretation is that a privatized housing system resulted in a
more efficient utilization of old, dilapidated housing stock and thus resulted in more housing
supply over the long run, and that depreciation rate of housing assets decreased due to better
maintenance. Research suggests the change to this variable was largely unanticipated.169
The housing market shortly following reunification follows this conceptualization well.
Housing prices soon began to rise, driven by the end of rent control policies and increases in
disposable income. By 1993, housing prices were approximately 13% higher than in 1990. The
scarcity of development sites and unknown legal relationships concerning property inhibited
early investment in construction, but by 1992 a construction boom had already swept East
Germany.170 Housing completions started to rise sharply in 1993 and peaked in 1997. Over this
period, over 600,000 new dwellings were constructed and roughly 85,000 flats were renovated.
This is roughly equal to a housing supply increase of 6%. However, over the same period,
demand rose by only 64,000 households, resulting in a vacancy rate of 13.2% of total housing in
East Germany. By 2000, one million flats were vacant.171
As might be anticipated, the initial housing subsidies did much to increase supply, but in
the case of East Germany they resulted in overshooting by construction developers who
produced too much housing. Ultimately, this overshooting caused a crash in the East German
housing market due to housing oversupply, which was especially problematic given that
politicians were so keen on improving economic development in the former GDR. This was
exacerbated by policies that reduced the tax advantage of real estate investing and that cut
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construction grants to real estate developers. These changes in conjunction resulted in a decrease
in the number of new construction starts and in prices. What were the implications of these
changes? Firstly, the reduction in tax advantage pulls in the demand curve in Graph 4 for a given
level of rent, thereby increasing the cap rate. In the short-term, this drops the asset price below
the cost to construct new buildings, which discourages construction, maintenance, and
reinvestment. This manifests itself as a decrease in housing starts in Graph 6 through a shift
along the supply curve. Secondly, the reduction in grants to construction developers raised the
average cost of construction in Graph 5, further amplifying the issue that price is insufficient to
meet demand. In the long run, the fact that asset price is below the cost of construction will result
in a decrease in the number of construction firms in the industry, pulling in the supply curve in
Graph 6 and decreasing housing starts even more. Eventually, the industry production rate will
be lower than the rate of depreciation for the stock, and the size of housing stock will decrease.
This decrease in housing supply ultimately drives rents and asset prices up through a shift along
the demand curves in Graphs 1 and 4. Eventually, this results in an equilibrium outcome where
houses are at set at the cost of construction. This is the same price level as before the shift in cap
rate, but rents are now higher and set at the higher required rate of return.172
Although the market started to stabilize, corrections in the housing market are slow due
to the durability of housing. Eventually, politicians decided to subsidize demolition of buildings
and change housing policy to reduce investment incentives. Although urban renewal programs
were maintained, direct grants and credits for construction were reduced. These policy changes
had the impact of increasing the depreciation rate of housing stock (for the demolition subsidies)
and further reducing the cap rate (for the grant reductions). These policy changes had the same
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impact as the post-crash policymaking by further decreasing the number of construction starts
per period.173
Today, the situation in the former GDR remains relatively similar. Housing stock in 2008
was at roughly the same level as housing stock in 2011. Furthermore, prices are still declining,
although they are now declining at a slower rate. In the former GDR, housing markets are still in
disequilibrium and will remain that way until housing stock decreases sufficiently and vacancies
drop.174
To summarize, the analysis shows that the transition from a planned to a market-based
housing system resulted in sharply rising prices and rents due to GDR housing policy, which
supplied insufficient housing because of both rent control and an inadequate construction policy.
The increase to prices and rents post-reunification was followed by a surge in construction
activity, which was amplified by incentives implemented by politicians to invest in real estate.
Unfortunately, this eventually resulted in overshooting by construction firms, resulting in a
housing market crash and an oversupply of housing that has persisted to the present. Today,
politicians are finding that it is much harder to correct an oversupply in housing as opposed to an
undersupply. Furthermore, it resulted in spatial misallocation of East German cities, as housing
stock was built mainly on the outskirts of cities.175

IDEOLOGY IN EAST BERLIN
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The disintegration of citizen support for Socialist ideology played a key role in the rapid
privatization of the housing sector in East Germany. Following the end of Soviet occupation of
East Germany, the success of the SED was more or less predicated on towing the party line of
the USSR. As the USSR and its satellites restructured in the late 1980s, the SED attempted to
prevent the reform processes occurring elsewhere from spilling into the GDR. A critical example
of this phenomenon was with the ban of the Sputnik, a popular German-language magazine
published in East Germany about happenings in the Soviet Union. The GDR government—run
by old party hardliners and entrenched in their conservative form of German socialism—
sympathized little with Gorbachev’s notions of reform and banned the magazine and other
publications to limit available information on policies such as glasnost and perestroika. Political
science research from the period shows that the bank of the Sputnik magazine on November 19,
1988 resulted in widespread protests. By most indications, this ban was futile: a good deal of
East Germans kept up with the news via the West German media. Sputnik had a limited
readership base: only 5,300 subscribers and 1,455 individual purchasers. Nonetheless, the
magazine was very popular due to its choice of interesting topics and the fact that it was one of a
very limited number of Soviet publications written in German. The broader appeal of the
magazine was apparent in the late 1980s, as it was widely passed from person to person, copied,
and photocopied. Indeed, the Sputnik ban moved to push many people into direct political
action—initially heated discussions among the citizenry, eventually handwritten flyers and
banners created in complaint, and ultimately protests. Initially, citizens protested for a reformed,
more humane Socialism than that which was espoused by the GDR political elite, especially
since chances of reunification initially seemed remote. The Sputnik was one of a larger series of

82

incidents that worked to mobilize the citizenry into political action due to growing political
differences between the political ruling class and the more reform-minded citizenry.176
Economic deterioration in the GDR only served as a catalyst for further political trouble.
At the end of the 1970s, the East German economy began to run into serious issues due to a
massive foreign debt. The GDR government began a “forced export effort” coupled with a steep
drop in imports, even of crucial items such as spare machinery parts. These actions began a rapid
deterioration in quality of export goods, ultimately leading to rampant obsolescence, growing
stoppages, and eventually plant damage. Although this policy gaffe was likely influenced by a
variety of issues, perhaps the most preeminent explanation is that the SED regime dedicated too
much funding to Honecker’s program involving the massive subsidization of basic goods and
housing.177
Although decreased purchase power due to the massive foreign debt remained was
problematic, the government provided a large basket of social goods that should have mitigated
these effects. Perhaps the best anecdote of how economic issues impacted individual East
German well-being is the Coffee Crisis of the late 1970s. In East Germany, one of the most
important imports was coffee due to strong East German consumer preference for the good. In
the late 1970s, the worldwide coffee market saw a massive increase to coffee prices; in 1977,
worldwide coffee prices peaked. For the GDR government, this meant that the annual cost for
coffee imports rose to 400% of the levels from the early 1970s; this increase was particularly an
issue due to low levels of hard currency faced by most Socialist nations in the period. To address
this shortfall, the GDR regime withdrew the popular Kosta brand and replaced it with a new
Kaffee-Mix which ostensibly consisted of half coffee and half rye. Soon, Kaffee-Mix was the only
176
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coffee brand available except for at the most expensive restaurants and coffee shops; provision of
Kosta and other brands was effectively withdrawn from public offices and state enterprises. The
new coffee not only tasted poorly but also wouldn’t work properly in state-provided coffee
machines, leading to widespread boycotting of the product and fueling criticisms that the GDR
government was creating a two-class society. The crisis subsided once coffee prices began to fall
following 1977 and with bilateral trade agreements with other coffee-producing nations.
Nonetheless, this episode clearly indicates how poor economic performance served as a catalyst
for popular unrest.178
As the economy declined and factories began to deteriorate, worker dissatisfaction began
to rise. In the GDR, the workplace was an institution that was central to Marxist-Leninist
ideology and played an important social function, as worker social identity was linked to work
brigades and collectives within the workplace. Put another way, the workplace not only was the
external manifestation of the SED’s fundamental Marxist ideology but also monopolized the
public sphere: everything from child care and medical care to sports clubs and shopping. As
dissatisfaction set in at the workplaces—by this point a social microcosm of society—it
destabilized the GDR dictatorship.179
Across all issues, GDR citizens became increasingly disenchanted with Socialism. An
unfortunate confluence of events dashed political support: other Eastern Bloc nations began to
increasingly turn away from Socialism with the fall of the Iron Curtain, workplace satisfaction
was at an all-time low, economic conditions deteriorated, and the regime passed unsavory
policies. These isolated conditions would ultimately combine and spill over into political action
and discontent with the regime as a whole and ultimately Socialist ideology. By the end of the
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1980s, East Germans bought less and less into Socialist ideology. This sentiment was clearly
manifested through Eingaben (political petitions) and the threat of Nichteeilnahme (nonparticipation) at upcoming local elections. Most of the Eingaben dealt with complains about
housing, but some even protested the continuing ban of the Sputnik magazine. Increased political
activism by previously politically passive citizens was perceived by the GDR ruling elite as a
growing threat. The increased levels of speaking out against undemocratic procedures was a red
flag that citizens were moving towards greater levels of political mobilization and underscored a
fundamental rejection of the prevailing Marxist ideology of the SED regime in the GDR.180
Post-reunification, this fundamental change in support for Socialist policy would have
important ramifications on policy, and ideology played an important role for both politicians and
citizens throughout the early reunification period. For West German politicians, promoting
housing privatization legitimized their ideology, as private property was a fundamental pillar of a
market-oriented society. The formerly-West-German Christian Democrats saw private ownership
as a prerequisite for responsible action, since the consequences of people’s own actions react
directly and undiluted on the people taking the action themselves. In addition to addressing
relatively narrow concerns about the housing market, privatizing the housing sector would mean
a major victory for this viewpoint. In terms of specific policies, FRG policymakers chose not to
transform state housing into conventional Western forms of rented housing through either social
renting or market renting,181 despite the fact that this may have improved housing outcomes
sooner in East Germany.182 This was likely due to an ideological decision by Christian

180

Paul Cooke and Jonathan Grix. East Germany: Continuity and Change. No. 46. (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2000), 7376.
181
David Clapham, ed. Housing Privatization in Eastern Europe. (London: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1996),
46.
182
Claus Michelsen and Dominik Weiß. “What Happened to the East German Housing Market? A Historical
Perspective on the Role of Public Funding.” Post-Communist Economies 22 (2010).

85

Democrats in the 1980s to promote growth in home ownership over the role of social housing or
market renting. This philosophy once again plays into the Christian Democrat ideological plank
that responsible action is predication on individuals acting rationally; by selling housing to
individual homeowners, FRG policymakers put the onus on individuals to efficiently manage the
housing stock, despite the fact that individual homeowners arguably lacked the information
needed to make responsible housing choices.183
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SECTION 6: ANALYSIS OF MOSCOW

POLITICAL HISTORY OF RUSSIA
To understand Russian struggles with housing privatization, it is perhaps best to start with
the political history—the legacy of property in Russia before the Bolsheviks and ultimately the
creation of the Soviet command-administrative system. Russia very much grew up under the
Soviet system. Starting in 1917, the country was shaped and industrialized under Socialist rule.
For almost three-quarters of a century, the Soviet system created all housing in the nation—cities
were built, housing was allocated, architecture was chosen, and much more all under the reign of
a command-administrative system. By describing the property rights system in Czarist Russia
and the early workings of property in Soviet Russia, a more complete understanding of the
state’s control of property can be achieved.
When the Bolsheviks seized control of the Russian empire in 1917, Russia was not a
burgeoning capitalist paradise but rather a feudal system emerging from some early bouts of
industrialization. In the early 1700s, all Russian lands belonged to the Czar. In the mid-1800s,
the Russian serfs did receive a small amount of land following their emancipation. However this
property was burdened with heavy redemption payments, and land was owned collectively and
administered through a village commune. By the end of the Czarist period, property remained
almost entirely in the hands of the Czar and the nobility, although the first decade of the 1900s
saw changes that created the existence of private farms and other instances of private property.
Even industrialization was state-run: the government created and funded whole factories by
decree and even named their managers and laborers. 184
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In the early years after the revolution, the Bolsheviks did not seek to abolish private
property entirely and for a brief stint even experimented with state capitalism through programs
such as the New Economic Policy. In the late 1920s and the early 1930s, Stalin reversed early
economic policy with extensive nationalization and crash industrialization. Virtually all of the
Russian economy came under state control. Stalin’s policy defined what would ultimately be
considered “Socialist” ownership, and enormous administrative elite developed to manage new
state assets. As the Stalinist state expanded to administer property in all economic sectors, it also
centralized authority. The command system created Stalin would by and large persist for the rest
of the existence of the Soviet Union.185
Despite attempts to reform the bureaucracy, the hyper-statization of the Soviet economy
persisted through both Khrushchev’s and Brezhnev’s regimes. By the 1980s, the Soviet economy
was still growing, despite slowing growth rates, manifest inefficiencies, violations of the
system’s own rules, growing bureaucracy, and a general lack of cooperation between ministries.
During Gorbachev’s tenure, radical reforms to private property were initiated but couched in the
language of Socialist ideology. Although these policies marked a break from previous Soviet
policies, some scholars argue that they did not go far enough. Nonetheless, Gorbachev’s policies
did achieve some important goals; they decentralized authority, began to break up ministries, and
formally established the beginning of private enterprise in the Soviet economy.186
The final disintegration of the Soviet Union can be illustrated through certain major
events. Firstly, the March 1990 free local body elections made political powers dependent on
voters’ confidence for essentially the first time, ultimately leading to the rise of a persistent
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political confrontation between representative bodies and executive structures. Secondly, the
abolition of the USSR Constitution Article 6—which stipulated the leadership role of the
Communist Party in the political life of the nation—deprived the Communist Party of its de jure
political monopoly. Thirdly, the presence of major political differences and struggles was thrust
into public awareness with the free election of Soviet deputies to the Gorbachev-created
Congress of People's Deputies of the Soviet Union and live broadcasts of legislative debates. In
this final phase, Soviet deputies fell largely into two camps: proponents of Western-style
democracy and market economies (including Boris Yeltsin among others) and status-quo
proponents who wished to “create order” by relying on already existing institutions in the Soviet
Union (including Community Party leaders, military representatives, and KGB). What was at
stake was not only political future of the former Soviet Union but also millions of dollars of
assets. Many of the status-quo proponents would turn out to be involved in the failed 1991 coup
d’etat. Finally, the declaration of sovereignty by the USSR republics led to the eventual
disintegration of the Union and, more importantly, the divergence of political and economic
viewpoints. This event is perhaps best characterized by the June 1990 declaration of sovereignty
by Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic.187
The importance of this political context cannot be overstated. Russia’s history reveals
how its industrialization and political formation is very distinct from Western, market-oriented
nations and even from other Socialist nations where prevailing Socialist regimes did not arise
from homegrown revolutions. Even in nations where a homegrown revolution took place, the
extensive level of economic development and industrialization that occurred under the thumb of
Socialism differs from the experience of other nations; in Cuba, at least the foundation of a
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housing market and industrialized economy was set by the United States during Cuba’s tenure as
an American neocolony. It should also be no surprise then that housing policy developed
distinctly from other nations in the Soviet Union.

POLITICAL CONTEXT IN MOSCOW
At the time of housing privatization, Russia faced a number of challenges to successful
housing privatization. The final disintegration of the Soviet Union meant that Russia needed to
not only needed tackle the gargantuan challenge of moving their economy to an entirely different
economic system but also develop a more robust legal and regulatory system. Even more
crippling was the period of rampant economic and financial instability in 1990 and 1991.
Directly preceding privatization, Russia faced hyperinflation of somewhere between 240%500%; an economic recession caused by government mismanagement and hyperinflation; a
significant increase in the national external debt caused by a significant drop in exports; and
predatory behavior by enterprise managers as they “carved up” state-owned enterprises, created
private contracts, and removed earnings limitations. Yeltsin administration policies seemed
ineffectual: expansionary monetary policy designed to retain budget allocations for enterprises
and social programs resulted in hyperinflation, attempts to balance the budget designed to
maintain basic social programs resulted in animosity between the government and enterprises
and placed undue financial burden on producers and local authorities, and little was done to
combat the predatory behavior of managers and the nomenclatura privatization formerly stateowned enterprises.188
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HOUSING UP UNTIL PRIVATIZATION IN MOSCOW
The challenges Russia faced during post-Communist housing privatization originated
with the rise of the Bolsheviks in 1917: the socialization of all sectors—including monopolized
state housing planning, monopolized state housing construction, and highly centralized housing
provision and distribution—had drastic implications on the housing sphere, which did not bode
well for when housing privatization eventually occurred. Indeed, it is clear that this
conceptualization of the housing sphere sits very close to the ideal publicly-run housing system
in our earlier characterization of housing system outcomes.189
In 1921, all land was nationalized, but owners of small homes were allowed personal use
of their own dwellings. During the Bolshevik’s state capitalist New Economic Policy, individual
citizens were allowed to build and possess small homes.190 Over time, however, more and more
housing became constructed and owned by the government. This housing was distributed by
municipal authorities or workers cooperatives based on a set amount of square meters per person
in a given family, and tenants generally had no choice in what housing they were offered. As in
other nations where housing is considered a social good, rent and utilities were heavily
subsidized by the government. Housing could not be bought and sold, but the Soviet government
did allow for housing to be exchanged with other families.
From the 1920s to the 1950s, Soviet families generally lived in dismal housing
conditions. Those that actually possessed housing frequently lived in barracks, “dormitories”
(mass housing for workers), or—for the lucky few—communal apartments.191 During this
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period, the Communist government passed policies or adopted Constitutional articles that
extended state control over all assets and curtailed personal ownership. Citizens were allowed to
small amounts of personal property and to their savings, although the government aimed to
eliminate this private property over the long run.192 Although a government goal was offering
private apartments for each family, families continued to live in tenements or communal
apartments into the 1970s. By the 1980s, high-rise projects with private apartments became the
main form of housing in cities, but as many as one-third of all citizens remained on the housing
waiting list.193
These housing developments occurred under the backdrop of important Soviet social
trends. Firstly, Soviet policy encouraged mass emigration of workers from the rural countryside
into urban areas. Rural residents would frequently adopt informal jobs or face underemployment
in cities to acquire some form of housing. In 1917, just 20% of Russians lived in cities, but by
the 1990s, 80% of Russians lived in cities. Secondly, insufficient housing resulted in
overcrowding and prevented new household formation, suggesting that housing shortage
numbers available from the Soviet period may understate how much housing demand was unmet.
For example, young couples would frequently remain with the family instead of forming new
households, and divorced couples were sometimes forced to remain in the same apartment
instead of separating.194
The most important changes to Soviet housing policy, however, occurred during the
period of reform in the late 1980s. With the initial period of perestroika, status-quo
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administrative approaches were used to solve economic problems. As might be expected, old
standard attempts at practical solutions were highly ineffective and smacked of old Communist
Party undertakings. For example, a major economic and social initiative was the Housing 2000
program. Originally based on a plan created by the 1986 Communist Party Congress, its goal
was to provide every family with a self-contained housing unit by the year 2000. Unfortunately,
the plan was infeasible from the start due to inaccurate projections: the projected housing stock
increase was too low due to the underestimates in how many new households would form—in
many instances multiple generations of families were living under one roof.195
Despite the Housing 2000 program’s underestimation of necessary housing construction,
the Russian housing construction sector—which was remained state-run at first—still fell short.
Although housing construction increased somewhat at first, the Russian recession slowed
housing construction in 1990 and 1991 to below 1989 levels. Furthermore, the distribution
system remained ineffective: families waiting for the distribution for state housing faced endless
lines. When families did attain housing, what they received was unsatisfactory. Due to high
housing demand, rents were high, but a lack of incentives and funds resulted in low-quality
housing that suffered from poor construction materials and inadequate maintenance. From 1988
to 1990, political focus shifted to the housing sector due to both the challenges the sector had
faced and the significant budgetary cost it incurred, both in terms of construction and
maintenance.196

GOVERNMENT HOUSING POLICIES IN MOSCOW
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By 1990, the need to switch to a market-based system was clear; Gorbachev issued the
first formal proclamation on the necessity of this shift that year. Gorbachev’s policy sought to
privatize state and public housing stock by transferring housing to owners through mass voucher
privatization; tenants of state-run housing essentially became owner-occupiers free of charge.
Furthermore, maintenance stopped being run by the state and instead became self-financed.
Change, however, was initially slow. At first, no real changes took place, despite Gorbachev’s
proclamations. In the fall of 1990, the 500-Day Plan or Shatalin-Yavlinski program was
introduced to the legislature. The plan called for a one-year period of cheap housing sales,
followed by housing sales at market price. Unfortunately, it was not adopted.197
In July 1991, legislation passed in Russia permitting many tenants to purchase their units
and, in turn, receive a significant amount of floor space for free. Additionally, local governments
were empowered with the ability to provide other determinations. Notably, in Moscow, the
government decided to not charge tenants at all for privatizing their homes; this was not the case
in other cities.198

The sales procedure in Moscow involved the following components:199


The law only pertains to state-owned (department-owned) and municipality-owned housing
stock.



Only tenants officially registered as the occupant of the flat can purchase the unit.
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The tenant is effectively offered a voucher free of charge. The value of the voucher is the
price of a square meter of an average-quality housing unit in the city in which the tenant lives
times the number of square meters to which he is entitled.



Tenants are offered the entire housing unit for free.



Each family can only purchase a single unit under the privatization procedures.



During the transition period (of unspecified length, the old system for housing allocation, but
those allocated a unit have the right to purchase it under the aforementioned conditions.200

The summer of 1991 marked an early attempt at creating a market-based housing system
in Russia, but this transition would be heavily influenced by housing and economic policy in the
late 1980s. The recession, drop in housing spend, and chronically insufficient levels of housing
construction meant that the housing supply—the x-axis in Graphs 1 and 4—was much too far to
the left, pushing up short-term rents and housing prices. The national government issued a
number of policy reforms to complement housing privatization efforts. Firstly, the national
government gave local governments permission to raise rents starting in May 1992. Secondly, it
began efforts to resolve questions about the implicit property rights that tenants and owneroccupiers would possess, although progress was slow. Thirdly, it passed laws stating that longterm subsidized credits could be used for purchase. Fourthly, it developed a method for quickly
assessing the value for which properties can be purchased from the government. Fifthly, it
pledged to implement housing allowances to support tenants in the transition to a market system.
Sixthly, it expressed an interest in improving housing management. These six actions would
theoretically lay the foundation for a robust property rights system and for a healthy housing
200
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market.201 A healthy housing market would first require rents to rise, and yet Russian citizens
lacked the ability to bear rent increases due to the Russian recession and a weak macroeconomic
transition to the private sector. Implementing generous housing allowances, a clear system of
property rights, and an easing of rent controls would give the economy the jumpstart it needed to
move to a market-based system. Rents would rise in Graph 1, stimulating the demand for rental
industry investment in Graph 3. This would ultimately increase the number of housing starts per
period and raise housing prices until the demand could be sufficiently met, as was the case in
East Germany. As rents would rise, housing allowances would make up for the rent increases
that Russian citizens could not pay, and new housing developers, rental firms, and construction
firms would emerge to fill in the gaps that the state-run construction firms could not handle.
Unfortunately, this process did not emerge due to issues in implementation. Although the
national government allowed for rents to increase, local government did not act to ease rent
controls. Property rights remained murky, and formal resolution of implicit property rights that
tenants possessed did not occur. The State Savings Bank (Sberbank)—which had a virtual
monopoly on long-term housing finance in 1992—did not offer loans for the purchase of
privatized housing units, despite the privatization law’s statement that credits could be
purchased. Although the government did create a process for the timely appraisal of properties,
the price the government used was not a price that related to market value, which inhibited early
developer and potential homeowners from developing an early system of market values. The lack
of rent increases meant that no housing allowance was implemented, and the state continued to
maintain its monopoly of state maintenance companies, although local governments did try to
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develop some competitors.202 Rampant inflation in the period exacerbated the issue of
determining appropriate home prices.
By 1993, the state construction industry began privatization. New private enterprises for
building and marketing new dwellings was allowed, as was the use of private funds for housing
construction. Private housing construction and development firms soon surfaced in Moscow;
these firms typically focused on completing housing projects that were started and subsequently
abandoned by the state or on purchasing undeveloped land on the urban fringe and building
single-family homes. Many projects were initiated without any preliminary analysis of the
market or actual demand; instead, these projects were based on a Russian interpretation of how
rich people were supposed to live. Housing financing remained difficult to obtain; Moscow
housing developers on average financed over 70% of total housing cost with their own funds. A
legitimate market-based system of land prices did not emerge, and the local Moscow government
continued to offer land for free plus a square-meter-based fee. Finally, developers were required
by the Moscow government to offer 40%+ of newly-built apartments to the government free of
charge as a condition of permission to build; barely 50% of housing units were sold at market
price.203 Across the board, the government impeded progress towards a market-based system. In
Graph 1 of the Wachter-Kroll framework, rent controls prevented rent prices from increasing
sufficiently to spark housing supply increases. In Graph 2 and 4, a lack of available housing
financing limited the number of representative rental and construction firms that could even enter
the market in the first place. In Graph 3, policies that reduced the number of units that could be
sold at market prices dropped the cap rate, reducing demand for rental industry investment. In
Graph 4, a lack of land prices prevented adequate housing asset prices from being developed. All
202

Nadezhda Kosareva and Raymond Struyk. "Housing Privatization in the Russian Federation." Housing Policy
Debate 4, no. 1 (1993), 12.
203
Olga Z. Kaganova. "Russian Home-Building in Transition." Journal of Real Estate Literature 7, no. 1 (1999).

97

of these impediments resulted in a level of new housing investment in Graph 6 that was very,
very low. Housing developers would not be able to turn a profit without extralegal or illegal
activity.
By the early 2000s, little had changed. Although the legal framework on property rights
and housing market operations began to emerge, these new laws were disproportionately
unfavorable to developers. Rental controls and price policy on housing utilities remained in
place; these policies slowed down the pace of privatization. Rents stayed artificially low and
standardized; the amount charged for rent theoretically should equal the maintenance fee, but
owner-occupiers are expected to pay property taxes not paid by renters. Russian citizens tried to
play both the private and public housing systems off of each other to achieve the greatest deal.
Renters are legally entitled to improved state-provided housing if living in sub-standard units,
but they forfeit this right if they privatize their low-quality housing. Unfortunately, a sustainable
housing system had not emerged.204

IDEOLOGY IN MOSCOW
The maintenance of popular support for Socialist ideology played a key role in the slow
and inefficient privatization of the housing sector in Russia. The Soviet Union’s distinct
ideology—forged in the crucible of the nation’s nearly century-long struggle with the adoption
of Marxist ideology—had a strong impact on housing throughout the nation’s history. A central
tenant of Marxist ideology has been the rejection of private ownership of capital and of the
means of production. This ideology resulted in the suppression of land markets, particularly in
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Soviet Russia due to its long period of rule under Socialist ideology.205 As an extension of this
principle, land officially had no value under the Soviet system, which resulted in significant
disparities between Moscow and other, non-Socialist metropolises.
Successful adoption of an extensive system of private property required a change in
norms that was difficult for Russians to stomach ideologically. For almost a century, the USSR
all but totally prohibited legal private enterprise activity, providing Russian citizens with little
experience navigating capitalist institutions and traditions. What private enterprise did exist took
place under an extensive black market system, corroborating the Socialist message that private
business was not only exploitative but also immoral. For post-Communist privatization to be
successful, the ruling regime needed to both teach citizens the concepts and principles of
capitalist economics and counteract the negative stigma against Capitalism built up over decades,
in addition to the already difficult task of implementing effective policies for moving the
economy out from under state control.206
By the early 1990s, a transition to a market-based Russian economy seemed imminent.
Glasnost and perestroika created a nascent private sector in Russia, and the rise to power of
Boris Yeltsin and other seemingly pro-market politicians in August 1991 foreshadowed the swift
adoption of change. Nonetheless, public opinion was slow to change in Russia. By the end of
1991, just 31% of Russians wanted to work for private businesses, and public sentiment towards
the private sector seemed to become even less positive by the late 1990s.207 Although
privatization was supposed to rationalize the Russian economy through the free market, political
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commentators argued that privatization was taking place haphazardly and inefficiently. Russians
balked at the widespread practice of “stripping” or “rolling,” where investors would purchase
state firms and sell their assets piecemeal to others. These practices smacked of speculation and
seemed to add little value to the Russian economy.208
These cultural challenges—and above all, the inculcation that ownership is theft—could
explain some of the peculiarities with Russian housing privatization. Firstly, the manner in which
housing privatization occurred in Russia was quite distinct. Unlike in other post-Socialist
countries where housing was sold at discount prices to residents, dwellings were offered to their
residents in Russia free of charge following the transfer of state ownership to the municipalities.
This significant policy difference can be explained in part by ideologically-driven political
entrenchment for politicians, even following the decision to pursue housing privatization.
Despite the knowledge that a state-run system couldn’t work, Russian politicians struggled to
find a unified voice to pursue market reforms following the fall of the Soviet Union.209 Unlike in
other post-Communist nations such as the former Czechoslovakia, anti-Communist sentiment in
Russia was quite weak. Surveys throughout the 1990s corroborate this claim: 62% of Russians
had a positive opinion of the old Communist regime in 1993, and 70% of Russians had a positive
opinion of the old Communist regime in 2000. This ideological contrast made throwing off the
shackles of Communism very difficult. As could be expected, this popular opinion shaped the
relative degree of legitimacy of political actors and institutions through the post-Communist
transition. Because of tacit public approval, legislative institutions from the late Soviet period
were maintained, and Soviet-era politicians maintained their political posts. Thus, when housing
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privatization decisions were made, the Russian legislature was dominated by pro-Communist
politicians. The unusual decision to avoid a market mechanism for housing privatization during
the post-Communist transition to a market-based system is a manifestation of this political
struggle.210
Ideological decision-making was not limited to politicians. Ideology is also apparent with
individual citizen decisions during the period. Because of mass housing privatization policies,
residents acquired a valuable asset free of charge by agreeing to privatize. However, despite this
lucrative opportunity, few Russians accepted the homeownership offer in the early 1990s.
Despite the fact that privatization was free and despite the strong public support for housing
privatization—as exemplified by 70% of nationally surveyed households wishing to own their
dwellings in 1993—only 18% of eligible dwellings were privatized in that year. Low adoptions
levels were due in part to woes caused by poor execution. For example, many older Russians
continued to rent due to the pain of completing the necessary paperwork.211 Nonetheless, the low
levels of adoption are somewhat surprising. This response contrasts greatly with the right to buy
policies that existed in non-transition economies such as the U.K. and the Netherlands, where
public housing was offered for sale to the tenants in the early 1980s and was enthusiastically
adopted by citizens. The response to housing privatization was also slow as compared to other
post-Communist nations such as Hungary.212 Although some research suggests that certain issues
like a desire to avoid paying for maintenance could explain the lackluster response, there remains
considerable uncertainty around the phenomenon, and little can explain the gradual acceleration
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of adoption. Why were just 50,000 units privatized annually in the early 1990s while 1,000,000+
units were privatized by the early 2000s?213 Ideology—the decades-long notion that ownership is
theft in the Soviet mindset—could explain the early lackluster response and the gradual increase
in housing privatization over time, despite decreasing incentives to do so.214 Appel explains that
in Russia, politicians could neither easily reject Communism as alien nor overlook the foreign
connotation of a liberal property rights system. This was exacerbated by a refusal by politicians
to develop an ideological legitimating campaign.215 As Russians gradually moved towards
adopting a free-market ideology, a greater number of citizens decided to privatize their homes.
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SECTION 7: CONCLUSION: WHAT CAN WE EXPECT FOR HAVANA?

A comparison of two distinct cases of post-Communist housing privatization—East
Berlin and Moscow—allows us to draw inferences about commonalities in future examples of
post-Communist housing privatization and to elucidate what might occur in Havana if housing
privatization occurs. What convergences have we seen between East Berlin and Moscow?
Firstly, housing stock increased markedly between both nations. Housing shortages are a
problem that the vast majority of Socialist nations face due to the inefficiency of a centrallyplanned, public-oriented housing system. Indeed, it appears from the comparative method of
analysis used in this paper that Havana can expect to see a dramatic increase in housing stock.
This increase is long overdue and should begin to address the chronic housing shortage of over
1,000,000 housing units in Cuba today.
Secondly, post-Communist housing privatization resulted in an increase to housing
quality over time in both East Berlin and Moscow. As the burden on housing construction and
provision is decentralized, consumer power and consumer choice increase. Unlike centrallyplanned systems—where coordination issues belie the potential to meet the needs of all
customers—a decentralized system is able to address the difficult coordination problem of
designing, constructing, and provision of housing the meets consumer needs. That—coupled
with more effective cost controls—means that not only is higher-quality housing built but also
new housing is built with the attributes that consumers want, resulting in it being considered
higher quality.
Thirdly, in both Moscow and East Berlin, housing prices initially spiked, as housing
prices under the Socialist regime were much too low across the board as some rents and costs
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were borne by the government. In the short-term, housing privatization resulted in a spike in
housing prices and rents, caused predominantly by the grossly insufficient supply of viable
housing. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that Socialist nations typically do a poor job of
recycling old buildings into new properties, meaning much housing investment happens on the
outskirts of cities; housing demand in contrast is typically greatest in the city center, further
contributed to insufficient housing supply. Over the long-run, as the housing market begins to
function properly and achieves a stable long-term equilibrium, housing prices decrease.
Fourthly, housing privatization results initially in mistakes in housing construction levels.
In East Berlin, investor overconfidence in rising home prices and an extensive array of
government-provided subsidies resulted in irrational exuberance and too much housing
construction. This ultimately resulted in a crash in home prices before prices leveled off in the
long-run. In Moscow, the government did not properly lay the groundwork for housing
privatization to occur: a strong legal system was not developed, insufficient subsidies were
provided, and the government did not phase out public housing construction quickly enough.
This resulted in a situation where the public housing system continued to be the main entity
involved in housing construction and a housing shortage persisted at the same time that housing
allowances for citizens were phased out. This placed undue burden on the average Russian
citizen and prevented Russia from attaining a speedy exit from the recession and slow economic
growth it faced in the 1990s and early 2000s.
Fifthly, government policy tools such as tax subsidies and direct grants appear to have a
significant and important impact promoting housing supply. In the case of East Berlin, the
presence of these tools resulted in over-construction and eventually housing supply bubble. In
the case of Moscow, the absence of these tools resulted in sufficient housing construction by
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private firms. Proper application of just the right amount of these policy initiatives promotes a
swift transition to a stable housing market.
Sixthly, housing privatization in the post-Communist context results in a significant
reduction in public expenditure. Socialist typically suffer from slower economic growth than
their non-Socialist peers due to a centrally-planned economic system. In both the Moscow and
East Berlin cases, privatization of the housing sector freed up funds for investment in other
important industry sectors and infrastructure. Housing privatization also transfers the
responsibility for future repairs from the state to private firms, which reduces future incurred
public expenditures.216
Seventhly, across both country examples, tenancy rights have stayed strong. In many
market-oriented housing systems, tenants have very little power compared to landlords and
investors. However, in the post-Communist transition to a market-oriented housing system,
tenants maintain strong rights to occupancy. In some cases, the difficulty of evicting tenants is so
great that it acts as a powerful disincentive for businesses participating in the residential real
estate market.
Eighthly, ideology seems to impact or correlate with a more rapid housing privatization
transition. Put another way, when policymakers communicate the transition to a market-oriented
system in the language of the ideology, the transition to a stable housing market appears to
complete more quickly, although it is not known whether this relationship is causal or simply
correlated. In any case, politicians appear to have an important role. In East Berlin, a series of
political gaffes resulted in turning popular sentiment against Socialism, which shaped and
accelerated the housing privatization transition. In Moscow, politicians did not properly consider
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the need to address and ease ideological concerns, which may have slowed the housing
privatization transition process down. Other research seems to corroborate this.217,218

WHAT DOES OTHER RESEARCH SUGGEST WHAT WILL HAPPEN IN HAVANA?
Based on this analysis method from comparative politics, Havana can expect a significant
increase in housing stock, an increase in housing quality, a short-term spike in housing prices
followed by a long-term decrease, initial mistakes in housing construction levels, tax subsidies
and direct grants to be effective tools for promoting housing construction, a significant reduction
in public expenditure, strong tenancy rights to be maintained, and ideology to serve an important
role in speeding up the transition to a stable housing market.
However, other research on the post-Communist privatization process can build out our
understanding of the challenges and obstacles Cuba may face as it transitions to a private
housing sector. Perhaps the most important of these challenges are those that are faced by cities
developed under a Socialist system after the nation transitions to a market-oriented economic
system. Specifically, housing misallocation may mean that some land needs to be demolished
before it’s valuable, especially for housing tenements built on the exterior of cities. Spatial
misallocations of housing are alluded to in both the East Berlin and the Moscow examples.
Researchers have discovered that cities that develop under Socialist governments, systems, and
norms have distinct layouts from those that develop under market-based systems, although the
intensity to which this occurred was different between East Berlin and Moscow due to their
differing political histories. Accordingly, the challenges presented by these architectures are
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relevant to East Berlin, Moscow, and ultimately Havana, although the magnitude of the
challenges once again will vary. Under Socialist governments, city and housing systems develop
without any reference to private individual property, market mechanisms, or private financing.
Put separately, almost all urban growth is based on three major price distortions: land value (i.e.
location, quality, and amenities) is not priced, capital bears no interest, and energy prices are
much cheaper than world market prices. This results in cities with strikingly different layouts
than market cities, which has an important impact on layout. Socialist cities develop much like
concentric growth circles on a tree. Cities have a central industrialized city core where all the
jobs are that has low urban density, and households tend to be concentrated on the periphery with
increasing urban densities further and further from the core. This layout originates a challenge
known as the “fallow land” syndrome, an issue common in planned economies without market
systems. The “fallow land” syndrome occurs when existing land is improperly recycled and
maintained and new buildings instead are built further and further from the city on undeveloped
land. This results in a situation where high-value land located in city centers is not used to its
utmost potential and as a result citizens face long commute times and costs every day to get to
work, lowering labor productivity. Furthermore, property developed under this system can have
minimal asset value when a market system is adopted, as these properties are too far from
services to be allocatively efficient, even though they may have many high-quality amenities.219
Unfortunately, evidence shows that this is the case in Russia, where newer properties were built
progressively farther and farther away from the city center, where the central business district
was.220 It also occurred in East Germany, where large sections of housing stock following
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housing privatization were useless because they were large urban estates at the urban
periphery.221 Ultimately, the legacy of the Socialist housing systems at the time of reform
typically involves the following components: extremely high state ownership, trivial rents
charged to tenants and poor maintenance by state housing institutions, the overwhelming of state
financing in new construction, strong state monopolies over production, barren uniformity and
low quality of the housing stock resulting in poor-quality housing services, and the absence of
land markets resulting in a variety of negative consequences on Socialist city layout. 222
One of the major findings of this paper is that tenancy rights remained disproportionately
strong following housing privatization in the post-Communist context. This outcome would
corroborate what happened during Cuba’s early political history: Cuban policymakers enacted
some of the earliest rent control policies in the world in the period before the Cuban revolution,
and there has been a long history of pro-tenant housing policy under the Castro regime. These
precedents suggest that once Cuba privatizes it may maintain rent control policies for the purpose
of equity. However, research suggests this may be a bad idea. This outcome can perhaps most
clearly be seen through American landlord-tenant law, which underwent a politically contentious
revolution in the 1960s and 1970s. The reforms enacted over these two decades were caused by
social and political currents that emerged in the 1960s223 and resulted in an increase to rent
control policies throughout the United States. Rent control statutes now affects a significant
percentage of US multifamily rental housing stock and are used in major cities such as New
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York City, Boston, San Francisco, and more.224 Economists today almost unanimously agree that
rent control has a negative impact on housing markets by creating a housing shortage. 225 Rent
control increases demand and restricts the supply of rental housing by artificially depressing
prices, ultimately exacerbating the housing shortage the policy intended to address. 226 Although
rent control adversely impacts housing, it benefits current tenants by disproportionally hurting
future tenants and those persons unable to vote through the reduction of available renting
options.227 Given the present housing shortage caused by the Socialist housing system,
maintaining rent control policies through the housing privatization process is unadvisable.
Cuba-specific research also sheds some light on what the Cuban housing privatization
process may look like. Although using the Most Different Systems Design to analyze two very
different case studies lays the basic framework for the convergence across all post-Communist
housing privatization processes, this method of analysis does not pretend to all of the unique
peculiarities of the Cuban situation.
At the present moment, popular ideology in Cuba appears to be approaching the
sentiments of East Germans in the late 1980s. Solving the regime’s economic problems will not
only selecting the right reforms for economic progress but also addressing popular sentiment.
There is no question that the belief system and social norms of Cuban citizens has been indelibly
changed by the last half-century of Communism. Nonetheless, there is some evidence that Cuban
popular sentiment has started to adopt a pro-market stance since the beginning of the Special
Period. Put another way, the ideological grip of the Socialist utopian narrative has gradually
224
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weakened as Cubans see the global market revolution and aim to improve the quality of their
lives. The housing market is one important battleground for exploring and understanding the war
for dominant economic ideology in Cuba. Housing under Socialist ideology is built on a platform
of collective property and of universal rights, including shelter. In contrast, housing under a free
market ideology is fundamentally grounded in private property and the ability to earn income on
privately owned goods and commodities, such as housing. Although these two ideologies are
somewhat contradictory, the beliefs of Cubans are not a simple binary. Curiously, these two
narratives intersect in intimate ways in the housing transaction process, where they inform and
reflect sets of practices that reproduce utopias of socialism and capitalism, respectively. For
example, Cubans may agree with and rely on certain components of the Socialist process, while
at the same time utilizing their understanding of how the informal housing market works to
acquire the most profit possible on a given housing transaction.228 According to some research,
Cubans believe that a transition to a market-oriented economic system will allow them to work
for themselves, buy a greater variety of goods and services at affordable prices, a system where
services are compensated on value and not entitlement, greater freedoms to do what they want
with less government interference bureaucracy.229 Although it is likely that Cubans will achieve
some of these desired outcomes in the long run, there is no question that they are idealizing what
the free market experience will look like. In the short run, privatization and shifting the economy
towards a market-oriented economy will likely result in economic hardship and the expropriation
of normal citizens by wealthy investors and foreign corporations; at the very least, this was the
case in Russia and the other formerly Socialist nations in the 1990s. Nonetheless, the battle for
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the hearts and minds of Cubans is critical to the success of any future privatization efforts. Once
the Cuban government attempts to implement reform, successful implementation of privatization
policies will depend greatly on the perspective and support of the Cuban people, who will
interpret and support these policies through the lens of their own belief system. Although the
Cuban government is virtually a dictatorship—and so public opinion appears to have little
political influence through mechanisms such as the vote—the thoughts and beliefs of the Cuban
people are extremely relevant in terms of their participation in the emerging free market system
that the current economic reforms are moving towards.
Another critical obstacle the Cuban government must face is tertiarization and its
ramifications on Cuban work culture. Cuba’s status as an American neocolony meant that its
economy was underdeveloped and largely dependent on the United States. This dependence was
never fully overcome in the following decades, as Cuba began to rely almost exclusively on the
USSR and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance for traditional commodity exports.
Under this system, Cuba was led by necessity to adopt a paternalistic and extremely distorted
international trade pattern, which resulted in the emergence of an irrational domestic price
structure. Before the Special Period, this dependence resulted in the adoption of capital-intensive
techniques that could only be sustained through external subsidization, a dearth of international
competitiveness in the agricultural and industrial sectors of the economy, the decay of Cuba’s
productive capacities, and a general lack of domestic self-sufficiency in the economy. Put
separately, this dependence resulted in fundamental problems regarding the structure of the
Cuban economy. Starting in the Special Period, the Castro regime adopted a number of reforms
to address these structural inadequacies. Up until the current moment, these measures have
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delivered a very modest recovery and have just begun to challenge the state Socialist model.230
Furthermore, the Special Period served to exacerbate these issues as more and more of Cuban
economy activity became dominant on providing services (and namely tourism) to generate
income. If Cuba does move towards housing privatization, this longstanding tradition of
tertiarization could be problematic. As the Cuban government moves towards a decentralized,
market-oriented housing system, individual citizens and agents will be responsible for the
provision of housing, for constructing housing, for providing financing, and for distributing
housing. Although research suggests that Cubans have embraced the role of housing middleman
through the corredores present today in Cuba’s informal housing market,231 there is not a strong
manufacturing or construction culture today in Cuba. This may result in further exploitation of
Cubans by foreign investors, as foreign firms take advantage of these institutional deficiencies to
place themselves as the agents involved in the housing process. Without Cuban entrepreneurs
stepping up and filling the voids left by the state, Cuba risks becoming dependent on American
corporations and the American economy once more.232

LIMITATIONS OF THE ANALYSIS
There are some important assumptions and considerations that must be mentioned as
limitations to this analysis. Firstly, comparisons to Moscow and East Berlin are roughly 25 years
old, and much has changed in the last two-and-a-half decades. Secondly, both of these examples
did involve post-Communist housing privatization, but they specifically were examples of post-
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Communist housing privatization in the context of the fall of the Eastern Bloc in the 1990s.
Although Cuba was heavily economically dependent on the USSR, the nation consistently tried
to separate itself ideologically from the Soviet Union following the Cuban Missile Crisis. This
ideological separation from the Soviet Union may mean that the Moscow and East Berlin cases
do not apply. Thirdly, this case study assumes that Cuba’s recent policy initiatives foreshadow an
imminent transition to a privatized housing sector. However, Cuba may instead move back
towards a Socialist model or find another economic sector than tourism to develop. These
developments could preclude the Cuban government from continuing to develop a robust
property rights system and could mean a move back towards fundamentally Socialist values,
laws, and norms. Fourthly, the East German example may be invalid for this analysis because
German reunification was a unique historical event where two nations were simply combined
into one.233 Fifthly, Cuba’s geographical proximity to the United States and its political history
as an American neocolony for a half-century mark a contrast with the sociopolitical and cultural
history of the former Soviet Union and German Democratic Republic. American involvement
and political interference in Cuba could impact the course of Cuban housing privatization.
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